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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
We deal today with another appearance of what is 
known as the “categorical approach” to determining whether 
and how a conviction under state law will have consequences 
for the convicted criminal under federal law.  We must apply 
it now in an immigration case, but, in whatever context it 
surfaces, it’s a fair bet that this formalistic framework may 
result in some counterintuitive and hard-to-justify outcome.  
And so it does here. 
 
Argentine citizen Nelida Beatriz Cabeda, a woman in 
her thirties, was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of 
having involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a teenage 
boy.  That conviction ultimately led immigration authorities 
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to find her removable for having committed what they 
concluded is a state-law offense qualifying as an “aggravated 
felony,” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), specifically the 
“sexual abuse of a minor,” id. § 1101(a)(43)(A).  Cabeda has 
petitioned for review of that decision, arguing that, 
notwithstanding her actual, admitted sexual abuse of a minor, 
she cannot be removed on that basis.  That is so, she says, 
because the Pennsylvania statute under which she was 
convicted could conceivably be violated by conduct that falls 
short of satisfying all the elements of the federally defined 
crime of sexual abuse of a minor.  
 
Regrettably, she is right.  The categorical approach 
mandates our accedence to Cabeda’s demand that we ignore 
what she actually did and focus instead on what someone 
else, in a hypothetical world, could have done.  That’s the 
analytical box the categorical approach puts us in.  Thus, even 
though it is indisputable on this record – and, in fact, no one 
does dispute – that Cabeda repeatedly had sex with a minor, 
when we assess her conviction alongside the pertinent federal 
statutes, the categorical approach blinds us to the facts and 
compels us to hold that the crime of which she was convicted 
does not amount to the aggravated felony of “sexual abuse of 





Cabeda is a citizen of Argentina who entered the 
United States in 1991 as a lawful permanent resident.  Many 
years later, as alluded to above, she repeatedly engaged in 
vaginal and oral sex with a 15-year-old boy.   She was 34 
years old at the time and well aware of the boy’s age.  The 
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encounters occurred over a period of several weeks and 
eventually came to light after the child’s mother found text 
messages of a sexual nature on his phone and took her 
concerns to the police.   
 
Once confronted, Cabeda confessed and pled guilty in 
Pennsylvania state court to one count of Involuntary Deviate 
Sexual Intercourse, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3123(a)(7).  She was sentenced to four to eight years’ 
imprisonment.  Her crime drew the attention of federal 
authorities, and, after serving the minimum required term of 
her sentence, Cabeda was released into the custody of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents in July of 
2018.  She was served with a Notice to Appear charging her 
with removability on two grounds: first, that she had 
committed the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor; 
and second, that she had committed the crime of child abuse.  
Cabeda appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and 
denied the charges.   
 
After the hearing, she filed a motion to terminate the 
immigration proceedings, arguing that her Pennsylvania 
conviction did not qualify as either sexual abuse of a minor or 
child abuse.  The IJ denied the motion.  He concluded that 
Cabeda’s statute of conviction categorically qualified as the 
aggravated felony of “sexual abuse of a minor” for purposes 
of federal immigration law.  The analysis proceeded in two 
steps.  First, the IJ looked to the definition of “sexual abuse” 
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8), an approach previously 
endorsed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in In 
re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 (BIA 1999).  
The IJ next referred to the Supreme Court’s observation in 
Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017), that, 
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“in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize 
sexual intercourse based solely on the age of the participants, 
the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor 
requires that the victim be younger than 16.”  Id. at 1568.  
Thus, since Cabeda’s crime of conviction likewise requires 
that the victim be someone “less than 16 years of age,” 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3123(a)(7), the IJ ruled that Cabeda’s crime 
qualified as sexual abuse of a minor.  And, since sexual abuse 
of a minor is one variety of child abuse, the IJ also ruled that 
Cabeda had committed the crime of child abuse and was 
therefore removable on that ground too.   
 
Cabeda appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  She 
argued that the IJ had erred in two ways – first, by failing to 
apply what she claims is a new generic definition of sexual 
abuse of a minor prescribed by Esquivel-Quintana, and 
second, by concluding that her crime of conviction was a 
categorical match for the federal generic crime of sexual 
abuse of a minor.1  The BIA agreed that the IJ had erred by 
 
1 Cabeda additionally asserted before the BIA that her 
crime of conviction did not qualify as a “crime of child 
abuse,” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  The BIA rejected her 
argument and affirmed the IJ on that count as well.  She has 
not raised that argument in her petition to us, perhaps because 
a conviction for sexual abuse of a minor is an aggravated 
felony and prevents her from applying for cancellation of 
removal, whereas a conviction for child abuse, which is not 
an aggravated felony, leaves open the possibility of that relief.  
See Salmoran v. Att’y Gen., 909 F.3d 73, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(stating that a removable alien may apply for cancellation of 
removal if crime of conviction is not an aggravated felony).  
The crime of child abuse is not listed in the Immigration and 
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failing to use Esquivel-Quintana’s “new” definition of sexual 
abuse of a minor.  But it concluded that the Pennsylvania 
statutes at play in the comparison of state and federal law are 
nevertheless a categorical match to that new definition, even 
though the BIA never specified what it believed that new 
definition to be.  It accordingly upheld the IJ’s ruling that 
Cabeda was removable as an aggravated felon.   
 




The Immigration and Nationality Act designates 
certain crimes as “aggravated felon[ies.]”  8 U.S.C. 
 
 
Nationality Act section laying out the exclusive list of 
aggravated felonies; it is instead found in a separate section of 
that statute listing domestic violence grounds for 
removability.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (providing list of 
aggravated felonies); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (E)(i) 
(identifying crime of child abuse).   In any event, Cabeda’s 
child abuse conviction remains as an independent ground for 
removal.   
 
 
2 The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(b).  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  
We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo.  Partyka v. 
Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2005).  “[F]indings of 
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would 





§ 1101(a)(43).  If an alien commits such a crime while 
present in the United States, he or she becomes subject to 
removal from this country.  Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The IJ 
and BIA both determined that Cabeda had committed the 
aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor – an 
understandable conclusion, given her admitted and repeated 
sexual abuse of a minor.  But Cabeda’s conduct is irrelevant; 
it’s her conviction that counts.  Supreme Court precedent tells 
us we are not to “look … to the facts of the particular … case, 
but instead to whether the state statute defining the crime of 
conviction categorically fits within the generic federal 
definition of a corresponding aggravated felony.”  Moncrieffe 
v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).   
 
In this case that means we are required to decide 
whether the pertinent Pennsylvania statutes defining and 
criminalizing involuntary deviate sexual intercourse are a 
categorical match to the federal generic crime of sexual abuse 
of a minor.  The offenses proscribed by the state statutes 
“must be viewed in the abstract,” to see whether they “share[] 
the nature of the federal offense that serves as a point of 
comparison.”  Id.  Thus, “a state offense is a categorical 
match with a generic federal offense only if a conviction of 
the state offense necessarily involved facts equating to the 
generic federal offense.”  Id. (internal quotation marks, 
alterations, omission, and citation omitted). 
 
A. The Generic Federal Offense of Sexual 
 Abuse of a Minor 
 
The term “sexual abuse of a minor,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A), is not defined in the Immigration and 
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Nationality Act (“INA”).  See Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 
F.3d 787, 792 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the INA “contains 
no definition of this phrase”).  The INA does define other 
aggravated felonies by expressly cross-referencing various 
criminal statutes.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) 
(stating that 21 U.S.C.§ 802 provides the definition of “illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance”); id. § 1101(a)(43)(C) 
(stating that 18 U.S.C. § 921 provides the definition of “illicit 
trafficking in firearms or destructive devices”); id. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(D) (making “laundering of monetary 
instruments[,]” at least past a monetary threshold and as 
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956, an aggravated felony).  But no 
such cross-reference is provided to give precise content to the 
term “sexual abuse of a minor.”  That, of course, leads to 
some uncertainty in discerning the elements of that generic 
federal crime.   
 
The BIA dealt with this uncertainty in its en banc 
decision in In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 
(BIA 1999), by turning to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8), “a code 
section relating to the rights of child victims and witnesses in 
federal criminal cases.”  Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 796.  Section 
3509(a)(8) defines sexual abuse to include “the employment, 
use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a 
child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, 
sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, 
prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children, 
or incest with children.” 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8).   Later, 
applying the interpretive approach set forth in the Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), we 
deferred to and adopted the BIA’s analysis in our opinion in 
Restrepo v. Attorney General.  We reasoned that the absence 
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of a definition in the statute indicated that the meaning of 
“sexual abuse of a minor” is not clear and unambiguous.  
Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 795-97.  We noted “that the BIA’s 
definition of sexual abuse of a minor [in Rodriguez-
Rodriguez] is a reasonable one and that it [was therefore] 
appropriate to exercise Chevron deference.”  Id. at 796.  
Accordingly, in our Circuit and for purposes of applying the 
categorical approach in the context of an immigration case, an 
analysis of the generic crime of “sexual abuse of a minor” 
depends upon 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) for guidance.  Despite 
that, at Cabeda’s urging, the BIA ruled that the Supreme 
Court decision in Esquivel-Quintana effectively overruled 
Restrepo and altered that prior approach.  That was error.  
 
In Esquivel-Quintana, the Supreme Court considered 
the immigration ramifications of a conviction under a 
California law defining statutory rape to include “sexual 
intercourse with a minor who is more than three years 
younger than the perpetrator,” 137 S. Ct. at 1567 (quoting 
Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(c)).   More specifically, the question 
was “whether a conviction under a state statute [thus] 
criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a 21-
year-old and a 17-year-old qualifies as sexual abuse of a 
minor under the INA.”  Id.  The Court began by reiterating 
the applicability of the categorical approach, saying that the 
pertinent section of the INA “makes aliens removable based 
on the nature of their convictions, not based on their actual 
conduct.”  Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any 
alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time 
after admission is deportable.”)).  The Court then focused on 




Noting again the parameters of the California statutory 
rape statute and California’s definition of a “minor” as 
anyone under 18, the Court observed that “the conduct 
criminalized under this provision would be, at a minimum, 
consensual sexual intercourse between a victim who is almost 
18 and a perpetrator who just turned 21.”  Id. at 1568.   The 
categorical analysis required the presumption that the 
behavior at issue was the least culpable that could be 
prosecuted under the statute, so consensual sex between one 
partner a day shy of eighteen and another on his or her 21st 
birthday was the frame of reference the Court assumed for 
judging whether the offense of conviction constituted sexual 
abuse of a minor under the INA.   
 
Because the INA does not provide a definition of 
“sexual abuse of a minor,” the Court turned to “the normal 
tools of statutory interpretation[,]” beginning with the words 
of the statute itself.  Id. at 1569.  Since Congress added sexual 
abuse of a minor to the INA in 1996 as an aggravated felony 
triggering removal, the Supreme Court looked to a then-
current dictionary for a definition of what constitutes “sexual 
abuse,” saying the ordinary meaning of those words “included 
‘the engaging in sexual contact with a person who is below a 
specified age or who is incapable of giving consent because 
of age or mental or physical incapacity.’” Id. (quoting 
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law 454 (1996)).  Because 
the INA requires that the abuse be “of a minor,” the Court 
decided the statutory focus is “on age, rather than mental or 
physical incapacity.”  Id.  
 
Turning to the parties’ arguments, the Court said that 
the government wanted a federal law definition of “sexual 
abuse of a minor” requiring only that behavior “(1) is illegal, 
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(2) involves sexual activity, and (3) is directed at a person 
younger than 18 years old.” Id. (citation omitted).  But, the 
Court observed, that “turns the categorical approach on its 
head by defining the generic federal offense of sexual abuse 
of a minor as whatever is illegal under the particular law of 
the State where the defendant was convicted.”  Id. at 1570.  
That effectively means “there is no ‘generic’ definition at 
all.”  Id.   
 
Instead of accepting the government’s unrestricted 
whatever-a-state-outlaws approach to defining the term, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner’s much narrower 
focus on the age of consent that is customary in many 
statutory rape laws across the country.  It was noteworthy, the 
Court decided, that the word “aggravated” precedes the word 
“felony” in the INA’s listing of “sexual abuse of a minor” as 
a deportable crime, and that the crime is listed in the same 
subparagraph of the statute as murder and rape, two of the 
most heinous crimes.  “The structure of the INA therefore 
suggests that sexual abuse of a minor encompasses only 
especially egregious felonies.”  Id.  Ultimately, after looking 
at other contextual clues in the INA and surveying several 
states’ policy choices on the age of consent for sexual 
activity, the Court said, “the general consensus from state 
criminal codes points to the same generic definition as 
dictionaries and federal law: Where sexual intercourse is 
abusive solely because of the ages of the participants, the 
victim must be younger than 16.”  Id. at 1572.   
 
That ended the matter.  The Court did not have to give 
a full definition of what constitutes sexual abuse of a minor, 
and it did not do so.  In fact, it expressly resisted attempts to 
push it past the limits of what was required to answer the 
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specific question before it.  There was no need to consider 
Chevron deference or any other issue that might bear more 
broadly on the interpretation of the term “sexual abuse of a 
minor,” “because the statute, read in context, unambiguously 
foreclose[d] the [BIA]’s interpretation[,]” which had treated 
the petitioner’s crime as an aggravated felony.  Id.  All that 
mattered was that the “petitioner was not convicted of an 
aggravated felony and [was] not, on that basis, removable.”  
Id. at 1568. 
  
 While there is a lot to learn from the Supreme Court’s 
Esquivel-Quintana decision, the primary take-away for the 
present matter is that the Court very deliberately ruled 
narrowly.  It did not purport to establish a full definition of 
“sexual abuse of a minor,” and it did not, in either purpose or 
effect, undermine our existing precedent in Restrepo in a way 
that would permit us to ignore that precedent.  One may sense 
some tension between the statutory interpretation undertaken 
in Restrepo and the analytical approach employed in 
Esquivel-Quintana.  Most notably, our opinion in Restrepo 
was premised heavily on the broad applicability of Chevron 
deference to the BIA’s expertise,  see Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 
793 (asserting that “Congress may have intended for the BIA 
to utilize its expertise to define the phrase” sexual abuse of a 
minor), while Esquivel-Quintana relied on ordinary tools of 
statutory interpretation and declined to resort to Chevron 
deference in answering the specific question confronted, see 
Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1572 (stating that “the 
statute, read in context, unambiguously forecloses the [BIA]’s 
interpretation” and thus Chevron did not apply).  But the 
implication that Chevron deference is unnecessary in one 
specific instance does not “sufficiently undercut the 
decisional basis” of Restrepo to allow us to say that its “rule 
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no longer has any vitality[.]” West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 93 
(3d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).3  In short, we are still bound 
by Restrepo.  Esquivel-Quintana has not changed that.4 
 
3 That is true even though the Supreme Court’s 
decision in another recent case, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 
2400 (2019), casts doubt on the kind of broadly deferential 
approach taken in Restrepo.  See id. at 2415 (considering the 
question of what judicial deference is owed to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations – so-called Auer 
deference – and deciding that “Auer … gives agencies their 
due, while also allowing – indeed, obligating – courts to 
perform their reviewing and restraining functions”).  
 
4 In the accompanying opinion concurring in part, our 
colleague Judge Krause says that the tension between 
Esquivel-Quintana and Restrepo is “irreconcilable[.]”  
(Concur. Op. at 4.)  That is because, in her view, “[i]n 
multiple respects, the statutory analysis of Esquivel-Quintana 
is entirely inconsistent with that of Restrepo.”  (Concur. Op. 
at 4.) She thus concludes that “Esquivel-Quintana has so 
undermined [Restrepo’s] analysis that … Restrepo is no 
longer good law.”  (Concur. Op. at 4-5.)  That is where we 
part company.   
As already acknowledged, it is true that Esquivel-
Quintana and Restrepo undertook the task of statutory 
interpretation on different methodological tracks.  Our 
decision in Restrepo was written at a time when deference to 
agency decision making often proceeded as a matter of 
course, while the Supreme Court’s decision in Esquivel-
Quintana reflects what may be seen as a more searching and 
nuanced approach.  But shifting interpretive methodologies 
are not usually viewed as carrying the force of stare decisis, at 





to overrule past precedent.  We have noted that the Supreme 
Court “typically avoids methodological stare decisis[,]” Am. 
Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. E.P.A., 792 F.3d 281, 307 n.8 (3d 
Cir. 2015), while observing that “federal courts do not treat 
interpretive methodology as a traditional form of ‘law[.]’” Id. 
(quoting Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against 
Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 Geo. L.J. 1573, 1576 
(2014)).  See also Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime 
Change, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1971, 1976 (2005) (noting that 
the Supreme Court’s methodological statements “are not 
binding on the Supreme Court or even on lower courts”).  We 
certainly agree that cases like Esquivel-Quintana and Kisor 
provide an analytical approach we ought to follow now, but 
that does not mean the substantive conclusions reached in 
earlier cases have all been overruled. 
If Esquivel-Quintana did what our colleague claims for 
it – that is, if it meant that our prior precedential decisions 
were all being overruled to the extent they gave broad 
Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration 
statutes – we think there would have been more to signal so 
dramatic a step than the mere observation that, in the 
particular case then before it, the Supreme Court saw 
Chevron as having no application. See Esquivel-Quintana v. 
Sessions, 137 S. Ct. at 1572 (“We have no need to resolve 
whether the rule of lenity or Chevron receives priority in this 
case because the statute, read in context, unambiguously 
forecloses the Board's interpretation. Therefore, neither the 
rule of lenity nor Chevron applies.”).   
So we are not persuaded that Restrepo has been 
overruled by Esquivel-Quintana.  That is not “turn[ing] 




Indeed, we have already taken the position, at least 
implicitly, that Esquivel-Quintana speaks to the question of 
statutory rape, not more broadly to the definition of the 
generic offense of sexual abuse of a minor.5  See Mondragon-
Gonzalez v. Attorney General, 884 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 
2018) (noting that Esquivel-Quintana clarified the meaning of 
“the generic offense of statutory rape”).6  And other circuits 
 
 
(Concur. Op. at 19.)  It is giving necessary respect to our 
existing precedent, even when we ourselves might be inclined 
to decide things differently now. 
 
5 In fact, on the topic of statutory rape, the opinion has 
the even narrower focus of the age of consent.  See Esquivel-
Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1572-73 (“We hold that in the context 
of statutory rape offenses focused solely on the age of the 
participants, the generic federal definition of ‘sexual abuse of 
a minor’ under § 1101(a)(43)(A) requires the age of the 
victim to be less than 16.”). 
 
6 It is notable that nowhere in Mondragon-Gonzalez 
did we suggest, much less embrace, the view that Esquivel-
Quintana enacted a sweeping change that will affect all 
matters in which we and the BIA have been called upon to 
interpret a statute.  In fact, even though Mondragon-Gonzalez 
presented the question of whether to defer to the BIA’s 
definition of the crime of child abuse, we simply stated that 
“Esquivel-Quintana ha[d] no application … at all.” 
Mondragon-Gonzalez, 884 F.3d at 160.  That pronouncement 
appears incompatible with the kind of sea change in our 




apparently agree.  See Acevedo v. Barr, 943 F.3d 619, 623 (2d 
Cir. 2019) (holding that Esquivel-Quintana “did not foreclose 
the BIA’s use of [§ 3509(a)(8)] in other instances” and thus 
prior circuit decisions to grant deference to that approach 
were still binding); Correa-Diaz v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 523, 
527 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that the Supreme Court “declined 
to rule more broadly on the generic federal definition” and 
decided only “one precise question: the definition of ‘minor’ 
under § 1101(a)(43)(A) in the context of statutory rape 
offenses focused solely on the age of the participants”).  
Pursuant to Restrepo, then, we will continue to defer to the 
BIA’s use of 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) as the primary guide to 
defining the generic federal crime of sexual abuse of a minor.  
 
That, however, does not end our task.  Section 
3509(a)(8) does not specify a mens rea requirement, and we 
cannot defer to a nullity, so we must look elsewhere to 
discern the mens rea required to establish the generic federal 
crime.  Following the analytical pattern laid out in Esquivel-
Quintana, we thus “consider the structure of the INA, the 
inherent egregious nature of an aggravated felony, and 
closely-related statutes.”  Acevedo, 943 F.3d at 624.  Those 
sign posts all lead us to the conclusion that sexual abuse of a 
minor is a crime that requires, at a minimum, a knowing state 
of mind.  
 
First, “[t]he structure of the INA … suggests that 
sexual abuse of a minor encompasses only especially 
egregious felonies.” Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1570.  
Again, “the INA lists sexual abuse of a minor in the same 






provisions” of the law, listing extremely serious offenses, 
“guide our interpretation[.]”  Id.  “When considering the mens 
rea required for a crime to serve as ‘sexual abuse of a minor,’ 
the court must keep in mind this categorization.”  Acevedo, 
943 F.3d at 624.  The Supreme Court’s suggestion that sexual 
abuse of a minor is an “especially egregious felon[y]” 
indicates that a mens rea of lower culpability such as 
recklessness will not suffice as an element of the generic 
crime. 
 
Second, the term “aggravated felony” itself implies a 
certain “inherent seriousness[.]”  Id.  After all, a conviction 
for such an offense “carries significant immigration 
consequences, including providing a basis for the removal 
from the United States of a lawfully present immigrant, or, as 
in this case, disqualifying a removable immigrant alien from 
discretionary relief from removal.”  Rangel-Perez v. Lynch, 
816 F.3d 591, 601-02 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).  An 
aggravated felony conviction, then, “must be for conduct that 
Congress has determined warrants such significant and 
serious treatment.”  Id. at 602.  And that too signals that a 
knowing mens rea is a requirement. 
 
Third and finally, our consideration of a closely related 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2243, confirms that, to prove sexual 
abuse of a minor, the prosecution must show that the 
perpetrator acted knowingly.  Section 2243, titled “[s]exual 
abuse of a minor or ward[,]” is a helpful analog to section 
3509(a)(8).  The Supreme Court reached for it when 
clarifying a different part of the definition of sexual abuse of 
a minor.  See Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1570-71 
(turning to 18 U.S.C. § 2243 to determine the age of consent 
for the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor).  
18 
 
Other courts, too, have looked to it when defining the mens 
rea for sexual abuse of a minor.  See, e.g., Acevedo, 943 F.3d 
at 624 (importing mens rea from 18 U.S.C § 2243); Rangel-
Perez, 816 F.3d at 604 (same).  Section 2243 actually 
incorporates two distinct mens rea requirements.  First, it 
requires knowing conduct as to the sexual act in question.  18 
U.S.C. § 2243(a). 7  Second, it establishes that no knowledge 
at all is required with respect to the victim’s age; in that 
respect, it is a strict liability statute.  Id. § 2243(d)(1).  We 
hold that the generic federal crime of sexual abuse of a minor 
includes at least the first of those mens rea requirements; we 




7 Our concurring colleague claims that turning to § 
2243 for guidance while declining to overrule Restrepo lacks 
“logical coherence.”  (Concur. Op. at 31.)  But Restrepo itself 
acknowledged that Rodriguez-Rodriguez only treated section 
3509(a)(8) as a “guide” and not “as a restrictive or limiting 
definition[.]”  Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 796 n.10.  It is thus 
consistent to both continue to adhere to binding precedent 
calling for us to defer to the BIA’s reliance on § 3509(a)(8), 
and, at the same time, to turn to other statutory aids when 
§ 3509(a)(8) fails to provide the necessary guidance. 
 
8 With respect to the mens rea regarding the age of the 
victim, the Fifth Circuit has held that a state statute requiring 
only recklessness is a categorical match for the generic 
federal offense of sexual abuse of a minor.  United States v. 
Rivas, 836 F.3d 514, 515 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing 
Contreras v. Holder, 754 F.3d 286, 295 (5th Cir. 2014)).  As 
just noted, however, there is no need for us to reach that issue. 
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In summary, section 3509(a)(8) continues to provide 
the contours of the substance of the offense, but section 2243 
sets forth the necessary mental state.  With the generic crime 
thus sufficiently outlined, we turn next to the relevant 
Pennsylvania statutes to see whether, by comparison, the least 
culpable conduct for which a conviction could be had under 
them would likewise fit the definition of the generic crime.  
 
B. Pennsylvania Involuntary Deviate Sexual 
 Intercourse 
 
The necessary comparison quickly shows that Cabeda 
is correct in asserting that there is no categorical match 
between the Pennsylvania statutes and the generic federal 
offense of sexual abuse of a minor.  The critical difference is 
found in the mens rea requirements – the state offense can be 
committed recklessly, whereas the federal generic crime 
requires a knowing mental state with regard to the sexual 
conduct. 
 
Cabeda’s offense of conviction is 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3123(a)(7), under which, a “person commits a felony of the 
first degree when the person engages in deviate sexual 
intercourse with a complainant… who is less than 16 years of 
age and the person is four or more year older than the 
complainant and the complainant and person are not married 
to each other.”  The term “deviate sexual intercourse” is in 
turn defined in 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3101 as “[s]exual 
intercourse per os or per anus between human beings and any 
form of sexual intercourse with an animal.  The term also 
includes penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of 
another person with a foreign object for any purpose other 
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than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement 
procedures.”    
 
Notably absent from either of those statutory 
provisions is any mens rea requirement.  The Pennsylvania 
criminal code has a gap-filling provision,18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 302(c), for just such a circumstance: “When the culpability 
sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not 
prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.” 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302(c).  Thus, the Pennsylvania code 
allows for prosecution under section 3123(a)(7) on the basis 
of behavior that is only reckless.9 
 
9 Section 302 is not divisible in a way that would make 
the modified categorical approach appropriate.  Although 
§ 302(c) lists three types of mens rea in the disjunctive, 
Pennsylvania authority suggests that they are alternate means 
rather than elements.  See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2243, 2253 n.3 (2016) (noting that alternate “mental states are 
interchangeable means of satisfying a single mens rea 
element”).  Section 302(c) itself refers to “the culpability 
sufficient to establish a material element of an offense[,]” and 
it provides alternative mental states for determining whether 
“such element is established[.]”  Thus, the statute itself 
distinguishes between the elements of an offense and the 
alternative means, listed therein, of satisfying those elements.  
Pennsylvania caselaw too appears to treat the § 302(c) mental 
states as alternative means of satisfying a single statutory 
element.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 924 A.2d 
636, 637 (Pa. 2007) (noting in prosecution for child luring 
that § 302(c) imposes a “duty to prove that [defendant] acted 




That conclusion is confirmed by Pennsylvania 
caselaw, which shows that other, closely related, statutes can 
be violated recklessly.  For example, section 3125 of the same 
criminal code title prohibits “penetration, however slight, of 
the genitals or anus of a complainant with a part of the 
person’s body for any purpose other than good faith medical, 
hygienic or law enforcement procedures” where, among other 
possible circumstances, “the person has substantially 
impaired the complainant’s power to appraise or control his 
or her conduct by administering or employing, without the 
knowledge of the complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other 
means for the purpose of preventing resistance[.]” 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3125(a).  The prohibition set forth in that date-
rape statute contains nearly identical wording to the statute 
Cabeda violated, and Pennsylvania courts have said that “the 
minimum mens rea for these offenses is recklessness.”  
Commonwealth v. Cosby, 224 A.3d 372, 419 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2019); accord Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, No. 2300 EDA 
2018, 2019 WL 3854450, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418, 427 (Pa. 2003) 
(noting in prosecution for sexual assault that § 302(c) 
“require[s] the Commonwealth to prove at least 
recklessness”).  We have also suggested as much.  See 
Aguilar v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 692, 695 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that sexual assault in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3124.1 constitutes an INA “crime of violence” aggravated 
felony even though it can be committed recklessly under 
§ 302(c), and noting that “the trial judge instructed the jury 
that they must find ‘that the defendant acted knowingly or at 
least recklessly regarding [the complainant’s] nonconsent’”). 
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2019).  The mens rea catchall provision in section 302(c) is 
the underpinning for those decisions.  
 
Similarly, section 3126(a) prohibits “indecent 
contact[,]” with indecent contact defined in section 3101 as 
“[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the 
person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, 
in any person.”  Again, Pennsylvania courts have concluded 
that the crime thus defined can be committed recklessly, 
based on section 302(c).  See Torsilieri, 2019 WL 3854450, at 
*5 (explaining that the default mens rea of recklessness 
applies); Commonwealth v. Carter, 418 A.2d 537, 540-41 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (same). 
 
That means that the Pennsylvania statutes are 
categorically broader than the federal generic crime of sexual 
abuse of a minor, since the federal offense must be committed 
knowingly, but the Pennsylvania crimes can be committed 
recklessly.  Now, one might be forgiven for thinking that, as a 
matter of common sense, it is scarcely conceivable that one 
could, as a factual matter, recklessly commit the crime that 
Pennsylvania calls involuntary deviate sexual intercourse.10  
That improbability, one might further think, should mean that 
the Pennsylvania statute actually is a categorical match for the 
generic crime of sexual abuse of a minor, because there is no 
realistic probability that Pennsylvania could or would enforce 
its statute in a way that would sweep in reckless conduct.  
Following that reasoning would allow for a more sensible 
 
10 And yet, given the breadth of the statutory language 
prohibiting penetration “however slight,” reckless violation of 
the law is not as absurd as it might seem at first glance.  See 
infra at n.12. 
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result here, the semantic strictures of the categorical approach 
notwithstanding.  Unfortunately, that analytical route is also 
barred by binding precedent. 
 
It is true the Supreme Court has stated that, at least 
under certain circumstances, the categorical approach 
“requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, 
that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls 
outside the generic definition of a crime.”  Gonzales v. 
Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007).  And it is further 
true that, in other circuits, Cabeda’s arguments may well have 
failed because of the improbability of applying a statute like 
Pennsylvania’s to prosecute reckless conduct.  See United 
States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218, 223 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (“There is no exception to the actual case 
requirement articulated in Duenas-Alvarez where a court 
concludes a state statute is broader on its face.”). 
 
“Our Court’s precedent, however, takes [an] 
alternative approach.”  Salmoran v. Att’y Gen., 909 F.3d 73, 
81 (3d Cir. 2018).  We have held that “where the elements of 
the crime of conviction are not the same as the elements of 
the generic federal offense … the realistic probability inquiry 
… is simply not meant to apply.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  So, once we conclude that the 
textual breadth of a statute is more expansive than the federal 
generic crime because the mens rea elements are different, a 
petitioner need not show that there is a realistic chance that 
the statute will actually be applied in an overly broad manner.  
See Zhi Fei Liao v. Att'y Gen., 910 F.3d 714, 723 (3d Cir. 
2018) (noting that “it is unnecessary to conduct a realistic 
probability inquiry” when “the elements of [the state] 
conviction … [do] not match the elements of the generic 
24 
 
federal offense”); Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 286 n.10 
(3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the realistic probability inquiry 
does not apply when “the elements of the crime of conviction 
are not the same as the elements of the generic federal 
offense”). 
 
Thus, the mismatch between the mens rea of the 
federal generic crime and the Pennsylvania involuntary 
deviate sexual intercourse statute leads inevitably to the 
conclusion that they are not a categorical match.  We are left 
with no option, then, but to conclude that Cabeda’s multiple 
statutory rapes of a 15-year-old boy do not qualify as sexual 
abuse of a minor within the meaning of the INA.  What a 
world. 
 
C. The Dissent’s Analytical Path Is Unavailable 
 
The dissent, understandably, seeks to avoid this result, 
but we cannot endorse the legal reasoning it uses along the 
way.  Our dissenting colleague seeks to retroactively reframe 
the Salmoran line of cases as applying only when there is a 
“clear difference between the statute of conviction and the 
federal generic offense[.]”  (Dissenting Op. at 3.)  Thus, in his 
view, the realistic probability inquiry is foreclosed only when 
the petitioner “definitively demonstrate[s] a difference” 
between them.  (Dissenting Op. at 5.)  In close cases, then, 
and only in close cases, will the inquiry apply.  But nowhere 
in Salmoran is there any indication that we were laying down 
a mere tie-breaking rule.  Instead, as already noted, what we 
said was that “where the elements of the crime of conviction 
are not the same as the elements of the generic federal offense 
… the realistic probability inquiry … is simply not meant to 
apply.”  Salmoran, 909 F.3d at 81; see also Zhi Fei Liao, 910 
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F.3d at 723 (holding that “the BIA erred in conducting a 
‘realistic probability’ inquiry where the elements of 
petitioner’s controlled substance conviction under 
Pennsylvania state law did not match the elements of the 
generic federal offense”).  In line with that holding, we 
engage in an ordinary statutory interpretation analysis of the 
statute of conviction.  And once we complete that analysis, 
we compare our result to the federal generic offense.  We do 
not then take into account how difficult the statutory 
interpretation question was in determining whether the 
realistic-probability inquiry applies.11   Tempting as it is, 
then, we cannot accept our dissenting colleague’s reading of 
Salmoran. 
 
But even if the dissent were correct that Salmoran 
requires a “clear difference” between the elements of the state 
statute and the federal generic offense, such a difference is 
present here.  Our dissenting colleague believes that 
Pennsylvania’s Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse statute 
requires “a mens rea of knowledge, if not intent.”  (Dissenting 
Op. at 6.)  He bases that conclusion on two premises: first, 
that a mens rea of recklessness would produce absurd results 
which the legislature could not possibly have intended; and 
second, that it is a mistake to rely on the default culpability 
requirements of § 302(c).  
 
 
11 Nor are we persuaded by the dissent’s approach of 
first looking for prosecutions and then concluding, after 
finding none, that the realistic-probability inquiry does not 
apply.  That is precisely backwards.  We only look through 
judicial records for prosecutions after we determine whether 
the realistic-probability analysis applies.   
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As to the first premise, it is putting the cart before the 
horse to start with the absurdity doctrine and then work 
backwards from there to interpret the text so as to avoid a 
preconceived absurd result.  Instead, we first interpret the 
statute according to its text and only then analyze whether 
that text leads to an absurd result.  To do otherwise leads to a 
distortion in statutory interpretation as we strain to avoid the 
pre-identified absurd result.  That risk is amply demonstrated 
by the free-form and purposive approach the dissent takes to 
arrive at a preferred statutory interpretation.  Regardless of 
any intuitions we may have about whether Pennsylvania’s 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse statute ought to be 
viewed as a sufficient match with the provisions of federal 
law defining the generic offense, our discomfort with the 
outcome in this case doesn’t allow us to rewrite our own 
precedent or Pennsylvania law.12   
 
12 The dissent’s purposive analysis fails even on its 
own terms.  The dissent claims that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has articulated one possible purpose of 
§ 3123(a)(7) as “to protect minors younger than 16 years of 
age from older teenage and adult sexual aggressors.”  
Commonwealth v. Albert, 758 A.2d 1149, 1154 (Pa. 2000).   
But the language relied up on by our dissenting colleague is 
from the court’s analysis of hypothetical reasons offered by 
the government in response to a rational-basis challenge to 
the statute.  The court’s recognition of a legitimate state 
interest sufficient to withstand rational-basis scrutiny says 
nothing about what mens rea would suffice to accomplish the 
statute’s purpose. In fact, the court specifically noted that 
there was no statutory purpose defined anywhere.  See id. at 
1152 (“At the outset, we note that neither the legislative 




As to the second premise – that § 302(c) is 
inapplicable in this context – our dissenting colleague cites no 
authority for that proposition, save a couple of opinions 
declining to apply it in an unrelated context.13  And, as 
 
 
history … disclose any official statement by the legislature 
regarding the rationale or policy motivating [its] 
enactment.”). Moreover, it is not for us to make 
Pennsylvania’s policy choice in setting the level of culpable 
mens rea for sexual offenses.  As already noted, it seems 
strange to imagine how the deviate sexual intercourse statute 
could be violated recklessly (see supra n.10 and 
accompanying text), but suppose an adult were to 
aggressively and inappropriately touch a child, and that 
conduct resulted in the penetration “however slight” required 
for a violation of §§ 302(c), 3101, and 3123(a)(7).  In such a 
situation, penalizing reckless conduct is not on its face 
absurd.  The dissent’s example of a parent feeding her child is 
plainly inapposite.  Such an innocent action carries no 




13 Our dissenting colleague cites Commonwealth v. 
Hart, 28 A.3d 898 (Pa. 2011), as an example of a 
Pennsylvania court engaging in broader statutory 
interpretation “rather than merely applying § 302(c).”  But at 
issue in Hart was an interpretive dispute over actus reus, not 
mens rea – specifically, over “whether the mere offer of an 
automobile ride to a child constitutes an attempt to ‘lure’ the 
child.”  Id. at 900.  In concluding that an offer for a ride must 





900, 909, the court unsurprisingly saw little need to engage 
with section 302(c).  No one argues that section 302(c) will 
answer every relevant question a criminal statute might raise.  
What matters for our purposes is whether it answers the 
relevant question we must answer – namely, the minimum 
mens rea for which a defendant could be convicted.  It does.  
And the answer it gives is different from – and broader than – 
the mens rea for the federal generic offense. 
Nor is the dissent’s reliance on Commonwealth v. 
Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623 (Pa. 2005), persuasive.  There, the 
state supreme court recognized that where a criminal statute 
“does not explicitly provide for an applicable mens rea, the 
General Assembly has provided a default culpability 
provision in Section 302(c) . . . that is to be applied.”  Id. at 
630 (emphasis added).  True, in applying section 302, the 
court stated that the mens rea default does not apply where a 
contrary mens rea “is . . . prescribed by law.”  Id. (quoting 18 
Pa. C.S.A. § 302(c)).  But it did so only because the relevant 
offense, third-degree murder, had a “consistent[]” and “well-
settled” mens rea (malice) at common law.  Id. at 630–31.  
There is no such common-law tradition for involuntary 
deviate sexual intercourse with a minor. 
Finally, the dissent cites to a lone concurrence by one 
justice that was joined by none of the other six justices on the 
bench.  See Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d 1136, 1151-
52 (Pa. 2014) (Todd, J., concurring).  The justices in the 
majority reiterated their “repeated[] h[o]ld[ing] [that] § 302 
provides the default level of culpability where a criminal 
statute does not include an express mens rea.”  Id. at 1149 
(majority op.) (citing Gallagher, 924 A.2d at 639; Ludwig, 
874 A.2d at 630; and Mayfield, 832 A.2d at 427).  Even the 
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already discussed, Pennsylvania courts have applied § 302(c) 
to closely related statutory language.14  So while it is true that 
the text of Pennsylvania’s Involuntary Deviate Sexual 
Intercourse statute does not itself contain a mens rea, the clear 
guidance from the courts is that we should apply the gap-
filling provisions of § 302(c).15  There is nothing unusual 
 
 
two justices in dissent were in full agreement on that point.  
See id. at 1154 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).  
 
14 See supra pp. 17-18. 
 
15 Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly emphasized the 
broad applicability of § 302(c) to the Commonwealth’s 
criminal laws.  The state supreme court has relied on it, for 
instance, in explaining that even for a criminal statute that 
lacks any mention of mens rea, the legislature’s intent as to 
mens rea is not unclear.  See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 
A.2d 418, 427 (Pa. 2003) (assessing 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3124.2 – 
a provision neighboring § 3123(a)(7) – that criminalizes 
institutional sexual assault and importing a mens rea of 
recklessness).  Indeed, once an interpreting court determines 
that the relevant offense was not intended “to be a strict 
liability crime” the court “need . . . do[] nothing more than 
advert to § 302(c) and require the Commonwealth to prove at 
least recklessness.”  Id.; see also Commonwealth v. 
Gallagher, 924 A.2d 636, 638 (Pa. 2007) (“As a rule, in . . . 
instances [where the statute does not express a mens 
rea requirement], Section 302(c) of the Crimes Code 
prescribes the default culpability requirement . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); Commonwealth v. Parmar, 710 A.2d 1083, 1088–89 
(Pa. 1998) (“The bribery statute does not have an explicit 
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about supplementing the text of a specific provision with a 
cross-reference to a generally applicable statutory provision 
despite the unfortunate result it leads to when made a 
component of the categorical approach to analyzing Cabeda’s 
conviction. 
 
So, while we are in complete accord with our 
colleague’s desire to mitigate the workings of the categorical 
approach, we cannot take the analytical path he suggests.  In 
the end, we are left to shake our heads at the path we are on.  
But, having followed that path as required, we conclude that 
there is not a categorical match between Cabeda’s statute of 
conviction and the corresponding generic federal crime. 
 
 
mens rea requirement on its face, but it is subject to the 
culpability requirements of Section 302 . . . .  Th[ose] 
culpability requirements . . . apply to all crimes in the Crimes 
Code, like bribery, [as well as] those outside the Crimes Code 
. . . .”).  The Pennsylvania code itself bears out § 302(c)’s 
broad application.  As the state supreme court explained in 
Parmar, see 710 A.2d at 1089, although the legislature 
crafted exceptions to section 302(c)'s general rule, those 
exceptions apply only to "summary offenses" and those for 
which "a legislative purpose to impose absolute ability . . . 
plainly appears[.]" 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 305(a)(1)–(2).  Neither of 
those exceptions, however, applies here.  We are thus bound 






 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the petition 
for review, vacate the BIA’s decision, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.16  
 
 
16 Nothing in our decision today means that Cabeda is 
entitled to cancellation of removal, if and when she applies 
for it.  Our holding simply means that she is not subject to the 




GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, concurring in part, 
dissenting in part, and dissenting in the judgment. 
 At the outset, I join the majority’s well-reasoned 
analysis with respect to the three conclusions in Section II.A:  
(1) Esquivel-Quintana did not provide a new federal generic 
definition of a crime of sexual abuse of a minor; (2) we 
continue to defer to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) as the primary 
guide to defining the generic offense; and (3) the mens rea of 
the federal crime of sexual abuse of a minor is “knowing 
conduct as to the sexual act in question.”1  Maj. Op. at 18. 
 I also share my colleagues’ frustration with the depths 
of the mental gymnastics that the categorical approach 
manufactures and the counterintuitive results it often produces; 
however, here the proper application of the categorical 
approach does not result in such a head-scratching outcome. 
 Initially, where I part with my colleagues is in their 
reliance on Salmoran v. Attorney General to excuse Cabeda 
from demonstrating that there is “a realistic probability, not a 
theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to 
conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.”  
909 F.3d 73, 77 (3d Cir. 2018) (Greenaway, J.) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  Their analysis in Section 
II.B leads to the challenging interpretation that a defendant 
could be culpable for recklessly “engag[ing] in deviate sexual 
 
1 Because I find that Esquivel-Quintana did not provide 
a new federal generic definition of a crime of sexual abuse 




intercourse” with a minor, whatever that actually entails.  18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3123(a). 
 In contrast, my view is that the categorical approach 
does not require us to go down that rabbit hole.  I therefore 
reach the opposite result, that Cabeda was convicted of an 
aggravated felony consisting of the sexual abuse of a minor.  8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).  
Accordingly, I would deny the petition for review for lack of 
jurisdiction.2 
 In explaining how I reach this conclusion, I will first 
situate Salmoran within the context of this Court’s treatment 
of the realistic probability requirement.  Then I will offer two 
reasons why Cabeda is not excused from demonstrating a 
realistic probability that Pennsylvania courts would apply a 
mens rea of recklessness to the sexual act under Cabeda’s 
statute of conviction, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3123(a)(7).  Namely, 
this case is distinguishable from Salmoran and other cases 
where we found it unnecessary to engage in a realistic 
probability inquiry, and that the majority’s interpretation of 
§ 3123(a)(7) is flawed, or, at best, inconclusive and does not 
render the realistic probability requirement moot.  Because I 
find that Cabeda cannot meet that additional burden (of 
proving a realistic probability), her crime is a match for the 
 
2 This Court has jurisdiction to review final orders of 
removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), but we lack 
jurisdiction to review an order to remove an alien who commits 
an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  However, this 
Court may retain jurisdiction to address the prerequisite of 
“whether an alien was convicted of a non-reviewable 
aggravated felony.”  Stubbs v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 251, 253 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2006).   
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federal generic offense and aggravated felony of sexual abuse 
of a minor. 
I. The Categorical Approach and the Realistic 
Probability Requirement 
 As the majority explains, the categorical approach 
requires us to determine if the material elements of the federal 
generic offense match those of the state statute of conviction.  
Maj. Op. at 6–7 (citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 
190 (2013)).  Where the petitioner claims that an element of a 
statute encompasses more conduct than the federal crime, the 
petitioner must have some practical basis for his or her 
argument.  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191; Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007); Lewin v. Att’y Gen., 885 
F.3d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2018).  In other words, the petitioner’s 
interpretation of the statute cannot be based on “legal 
imagination.”  Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193.   
 However, this Court has clarified that where the 
petitioner has already demonstrated a clear difference between 
the statute of conviction and the federal generic offense, the 
realistic probability requirement is superfluous.  Salmoran, 909 
F.3d at 82.  Indeed, we have found that the statute of conviction 
“plainly encompasses more conduct than its federal 
counterpart” based on a comparison of the plain texts of the 
statute and the federal generic crime, e.g., id.; Singh v. Att’y 
Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 285–86 (3d Cir. 2016); cf. Jean-Louis v. 
Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 481 (3d Cir. 2009), and where the 
state court has definitively articulated an interpretation of the 
statute that sweeps in more culpable conduct than that 
contemplated by the federal offense, e.g., Zhi Fei Liao v. Att’y 
Gen., 910 F.3d 714, 723–24 (3d Cir. 2018).  Having supported 
the argument with statutory text or state-court interpretations 
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of the law in these cases, we determined it was  unnecessary 
for the petitioner to further demonstrate a realistic probability 
that the state courts would interpret the statute in the 
petitioner’s favor; nothing was left to “legal imagination” in 
these cases.  Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193. 
II. The Realistic Probability Inquiry Applies 
 In my view, the outcome-determinative question in this 
case is whether Cabeda should be required to demonstrate a 
realistic probability that the Pennsylvania courts would require 
only recklessness as to the act of deviate sexual intercourse 
under § 3123(a)(7).3  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3101 (defining 
deviate sexual intercourse as “[s]exual intercourse per os or per 
anus between human beings and any form of sexual intercourse 
with an animal. The term also includes penetration, however 
slight, of the genitals or anus of another person with a foreign 
object for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic 
or law enforcement procedures.”).  For the following reasons, 
I conclude, unlike my colleagues in the majority, that Cabeda 
must make that showing. 
 
 
3 The majority correctly points to two mens rea 
requirements in the federal generic offense of sexual abuse of 
minor.  Maj. Op. at 18.  The second, strict liability with respect 
to the victim’s age, is not the subject of debate here.  
Subsequent references to the mens rea at issue will refer only 
to the culpable mental state as to the conduct of deviate sexual 
intercourse as defined under § 3127(a)(7) and § 3101. 
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A. The Present Case is Distinguishable from Our 
Precedent, so Cabeda is not Excused from Demonstrating 
a Realistic Probability 
 The lack of a clear difference between the mens rea as 
to the conduct under § 3123(a)(7) and the federal generic 
crime’s mens rea of knowledge distinguishes this case from 
those in the Salmoran line of cases.  As such, this is not a case 
“where the elements of the crime of conviction are not the same 
as the elements of the generic federal offense.”  Salmoran, 909 
F.3d at 81.   
 Cabeda’s statute of conviction does not reference any 
mens rea, so there is no textual hook for differentiation.  Nor 
have I or any of my colleagues found an occasion where the 
Pennsylvania courts have definitively spoken to the mens rea 
of the sexual act under § 3123(a)(7).  This case therefore falls 
outside of those in which we have found it unnecessary to 
inquire about the realistic probability that the state would 
interpret the law in the petitioner’s favor.  Because we are left 
without sufficient “guidance as to how the statute applies,” Zhi 
Fei Liao, 910 F.3d at 723, I would require Cabeda to 
demonstrate that there is a realistic probability that the 
Pennsylvania courts would find reckless conduct culpable. 
B. We Must Engage in a Realistic Probability Inquiry 
Because the Majority’s Statutory Interpretation Does Not 
Definitively Demonstrate a Difference Between the Statute 
of Conviction and the Federal Generic Offense 
 In an attempt to avoid this uncertainty, the majority 
presses to apply a gap-filling provision.  This leads my 
colleagues to the uncomfortable presumption that one could be 
convicted for recklessly committing the act of deviate sexual 
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intercourse.  Maj. Op. at 19–20.  The majority then relies on 
this awkward reading of the statute to differentiate 
§ 3123(a)(7) from the federal generic offense.   
 Unfortunately, neither the curious conclusion at which 
my colleagues arrive nor their path in reaching it alleviates the 
concern that the statutory interpretation they embrace is 
flawed.  The approach I embrace demonstrates that 
Pennsylvania courts would more likely apply at least a mens 
rea of knowledge, if not intent.  At the very least, this 
competing approach shows that the majority’s interpretation is 
far from definitive.  Left without sufficient guidance to 
construe the statute confidently, we cannot forego the 
application of the realistic probability test. 
1. The Majority Fails to Fully Consider Pennsylvania’s 
Approach to Statutory Interpretation 
 The majority would apply 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302(c), 
the default culpability provision, to insert a “recklessness” 
mens rea as to the conduct.  While the majority stops there, 
Pennsylvania courts have a more involved approach to 
statutory interpretation.  As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
describes, “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of 
statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the 
General Assembly.”  Commonwealth v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898, 
908 (Pa. 2011) (citing 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1921(a)).  
Importantly, “[c]oncomitant with these considerations, 
the Statutory Construction Act also sets forth certain 
presumptions regarding the General Assembly’s enactment of 
statutes which are to be applied when attempting to ascertain 
its legislative intent.”  Id.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has noted that, “[i]n particular, when interpreting a statutory 
provision we must presume that the legislature[] does not 
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intend a result that is unreasonable, absurd, or impossible of 
execution, 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1922(1).”  Id.  Indeed, 
Pennsylvania courts have refrained from a strict application of 
§ 302(c).  See, e.g., id. at 909–10 (choosing to ascertain a mens 
rea as to the act of “luring a child into a motor vehicle” from 
the language of the statute with guidance from the Statutory 
Construction Act, rather than merely applying § 302(c)); 
Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623, 630 (Pa. 2005) 
(declining to apply § 302(c) where “[t]he law is clear and well-
settled regarding the mens rea for third degree murder”); see 
also Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d 1136, 1151–52 (Pa. 
2014) (Todd, J., concurring) (“Neither the plain language 
of Section 302, nor our prior caselaw, requires the automatic 
application of Section 302’s default culpability requirements 
in every situation where a criminal statute does not expressly 
state a requisite level of culpability for the conduct it seeks to 
penalize. . . . Rather, Section 302 has a narrower application: it 
applies only where the ‘culpability sufficient to establish a 
material element of an offense is not prescribed by law.’” 
(quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302)).  
 After applying Pennsylvania’s approach to interpreting 
its own law, it is clear that a mens rea of recklessness does not 
comport with the legislature’s intent and would produce 
unreasonable results.  We therefore should not apply the 
default culpability provision in § 302 to supply a mens rea in § 
3123(a)(7).  Instead, we should find that the sexual act under § 
3123(a)(7) requires a mens rea of at least knowledge. 
 Although the Pennsylvania legislature did not enact a 
specific statement of legislative intent, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has noted that § 3123(a)(7) serves a legitimate 
state interest in “protecting children from sexual predators” 
and “assuring that a significantly older individual cannot take 
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advantage of a young child's complete lack of knowledge, 
inexperience or poor judgment.”  Commonwealth v. Albert, 
758 A.2d 1149, 1153 (Pa. 2000) (“We agree with 
the Commonwealth that the subject legislation serves a 
legitimate state interest, i.e., to protect minors younger than 16 
years of age from older teenage and adult sexual aggressors. 
Such an interest recognizes that older, more mature individuals 
are in a position that would allow them to take advantage of the 
immaturity and poor judgment of very young minors.”); see 
also Commonwealth v. Bruner, 527 A.2d 575, 576 (Pa. 1987) 
(“As to the necessity and purpose of the involuntary deviate 
sexual intercourse statute, the Commonwealth . . . does have a 
strong interest in . . . protecting minors from being sexually 
abused by adults.”).  It is clear that a mens rea of at least 
knowledge, if not intent, complies with § 3123(a)(7)’s 
legislative purpose.4   
 Faced with these statements by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, it is difficult to square the intent to punish 
sexual predators, sexual abusers, and older individuals who 
take advantage of children with a reading of the statute that 
would find reckless sexual acts culpable.  § 3123(a)(7).5 
 
4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s definition of the 
sexual act under § 3123(a)(7) as “oral and anal sex” also 
supports a mens rea of knowledge or intent.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kelley, 801 A.2d 551, 555 (Pa. 2002); cf. 
Commonwealth v. Hitchcock, 565 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Pa. 1989) 
(describing involuntary deviate sexual intercourse as “forcible 
sexual penetration of a person by another”). 
 
5 Several other circuits have also interpreted similar 
state statutes to require knowledge or intent.  See, e.g., Acevedo 
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Reading recklessness into the mens rea is also in tension with 
how Pennsylvania courts have so far interpreted the required 
mental state for committing deviate sexual intercourse.  
Indeed, to my knowledge, they have never found a defendant 
culpable for anything less than what appears to be knowing 
conduct.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 266 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (finding evidence that victim performing 
oral sex on defendant after previously engaging in other sexual 
acts was sufficient for conviction under § 3123(a)(7)); 
 
v. Barr, 943 F.3d 619, 626–27 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming BIA’s 
decision to use § 3509 as the generic offense and finding New 
York conviction for attempted oral or anal sexual conduct with 
person under the age of fifteen constituted sexual abuse of a 
minor); Correa-Diaz v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 523, 529 (7th Cir. 
2018) (continuing to apply § 3509 as a guide and concluding a 
conviction for attempted sexual misconduct with a minor 
constituted sexual abuse of a minor); Bedolla-Zarate v. 
Sessions, 892 F.3d 1137, 1141–42 (10th Cir. 2018) (applying 
§ 3509 as a guide for concluding Wyoming conviction for 
sexual contact with minor constitutes sexual abuse of a minor); 
Contreras v. Holder, 754 F.3d 286, 295 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(comparing Virginia statute of conviction for “carnal 
knowledge of child between thirteen and fifteen years of age” 
to § 3509 to find conviction qualifies as sexual abuse of a 
minor); cf. Garcia-Urbano v. Sessions, 890 F.3d 726, 730 (8th 
Cir. 2018) (applying Esquivel-Quintana’s age requirement to 
find Minnesota conviction for sexual conduct with person 
under sixteen years of age qualifies as sexual abuse of a minor); 
Bahar v. Ashcroft, 264 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(relying on the BIA’s decision in Rodriguez to find conviction 
for taking “indecent liberties” with a child under sixteen years 
of age constitutes sexual abuse of a minor). 
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Commonwealth v. Mawhinney, 915 A.2d 107, 111 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2006), appeal denied 932 A.2d 1287 (Pa. 2007) (finding 
multiple acts of anal and oral sex sufficient evidence for § 
3123(a)(7) conviction); Commonwealth v. Castelhun, 889 
A.2d 1228, 1232–33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (same); see also 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1982) (describing involuntary deviate sexual intercourse as a 
“general intent crime[]”).  The majority’s attenuated reading 
only drives needless uncertainty into a consistently-applied 
statute.6  Cf. 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1922(2) (advising that courts 
 
6 As indication that the Pennsylvania courts would 
apply a recklessness mens rea to § 3123(a)(7), the majority 
relies on three Pennsylvania cases interpreting two similar 
statutes in which the courts applied the default culpability 
provision.  But these cases are plainly inapposite; not one 
speaks to the mens rea of the sexual act, only to the mens rea 
of other elements that are not present under § 3123(a)(7).  
Commonwealth v. Cosby, 224 A.3d 372, 419–20 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2019) (applying recklessness to whether the defendant has 
the “complainant’s consent,” knows that “the complainant is 
unaware that the penetration is occurring,” or “has 
substantially impaired the complainant’s power to appraise or 
control his or her conduct”); Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, No. 
2300 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3854450, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 
16, 2019) (not precedential) (same); Commonwealth v. Carter, 
418 A.2d 537, 540-41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (applying § 302(c) 
to find there was sufficient evidence showing “a substantial 
risk that [the victim] was of such mental infirmity as to render 




should presume that the legislature “intends the entire statute 
to be effective and certain”). 
 Importantly, reading recklessness into the mens rea of 
the sexual act under § 3123(a)(7) plainly violates 
Pennsylvania’s tenet that courts must presume that the 
legislature “does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible 
of execution, or unreasonable.”  1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1922(1); 
see also United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 880 (3d Cir. 
1994) (“It is the obligation of the court to construe a statute to 
avoid absurd results, if alternative interpretations are available 
and consistent with the legislative purpose.”).  Certainly, the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly did not intend to make a 
mother or father criminally liable for “penetrat[ing]” their 
baby’s mouth, “however slight,” with a hot spoon, while 
holding the baby and cooking dinner.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
3101. 
2. The Competing Interpretations Present the Precise 
Challenge in Duenas-Alvarez 
 Clearly, I have failed to convince my colleagues that 
knowledge or intent is the appropriate mens rea.  So, I humbly 
proffer that my approach is at least as reasonable as that of the 
majority.  If we accept there are two equally good ways to 
interpret the mens rea under § 3123(a)(7), then the majority’s 
conclusion that Pennsylvania would apply recklessness to the 
statute is far from definitive and cannot be relied upon to show 
a clear difference between the state statute and the federal 
generic offense. 
 This case therefore falls under the same circumstances 
as in Duenas-Alvarez.  In Duenas-Alvarez, the petitioner 
posited an interpretation of state law, which had been neither 
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confirmed nor denied by the state courts.  549 U.S. at 190–93.  
Faced with two possible interpretations, the Supreme Court 
erred on the side of what was realistically probable.  Id. at 193.  
So, too, must this Court.   
 Instead, the majority favors a theorical possibility and 
therefore unnecessarily risks superseding the state’s authority 
as the primary interpreter of its own laws.  See Pinho v. 
Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 212 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he authority 
of state courts to determine state-law questions is clear: 
‘[C]omity and respect for federalism compel us to defer to 
decisions of state courts on issues of state law. That practice 
reflects our understanding that the decisions of state courts are 
definitive pronouncements of the will of the States as 
sovereigns.’” (citations omitted)).  In rejecting the realistic 
probability inquiry, the majority regrettably ignores the 
Supreme Court’s admonition to avoid “legal imagin[ings].”  
Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193. 
 Unrestricted by Salmoran, and for the reasons supplied 
above, I would require Cabeda to show a realistic probability 
that the Pennsylvania courts would apply a mens rea of 
recklessness to the act of deviate sexual intercourse.7 
 
 
7 The depths of the disagreements between myself and 
my colleagues in analyzing Pennsylvania cases is further 
evidence that we should tread lightly in interpreting § 
3123(a)(7).  So, rather than “put[] the cart before the horse,” 
Maj. Op. at 26, this application of Salmoran’s realistic 




III. Cabeda Cannot Meet the Realistic Probability 
Requirement 
 “To show that realistic probability, an offender . . . may 
show that the statute was so applied in [the petitioner’s] own 
case. . . . or other cases in which the state courts in fact did 
apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which 
[the petitioner] argues.”  Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193.  We 
have not found a Pennsylvania case that has applied a mens rea 
of recklessness to the conduct criminalized under § 3123(a)(7), 
so Cabeda could not have met the realistic probability 
requirement here. 
*** 
 I would therefore find Cabeda’s statute of conviction a 
categorical match to the federal generic offense of an 
aggravated felony consisting of sexual abuse of a minor.  
Having found Cabeda was convicted of an aggravated felony 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), I would deny the 
petition for lack of jurisdiction, which would preclude Cabeda 




KRAUSE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
I join JUDGE JORDAN’s excellent opinion (the Majority) in 
its three major respects.  First, the generic definition of “sexual 
abuse of a minor,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), includes a mens 
rea of knowledge with respect to the proscribed sexual con-
duct.  Second, Cabeda’s Pennsylvania offense requires a mens 
rea of only recklessness as to that conduct.  Third, under our 
case law, that is the end of the matter:  Where the elements of 
a state offense differ from and are broader than those of the 
generic federal offense, there is no categorical match regard-
less whether the petitioner can show a “realistic probability” 
that the state will prosecute the offense in an overbroad way.1  
Salmoran v. Att’y Gen., 909 F.3d 73, 81 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation 
omitted).  Based on these three conclusions, I agree that—alt-
hough the result is counterintuitive if not bizarre—Cabeda’s 
crime of conviction does not fit within the generic federal of-
fense of “sexual abuse of a minor,” and she can neither be re-
moved nor denied cancellation of removal on that basis. 
I write separately because I reach the first of those conclu-
sions by a different path.  The Majority rejects the argument 
that Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017), re-
quires us to revisit Restrepo v. Attorney General, 617 F.3d 787 
(3d Cir. 2010), which, in interpreting “sexual abuse of a 
 
1 That is, I join in full not only JUDGE JORDAN’s analysis of 
the contents of Pennsylvania law, Maj. Op. 19–22, but also his 
application of our holdings in the Salmoran line of cases, id. at 
22–24, and his rejection of the alternative lines of reasoning 








minor,” deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) 
decision in In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 
(BIA 1999) (en banc).  Its reasoning is that Esquivel-Quintana 
reaches no further than its context—fixing the age of consent 
for statutory rape offenses based solely on the participants’ 
ages—and gives us no basis to depart from Restrepo.  Yet once 
the Majority turns to defining the generic federal offense, it 
does not rely on Restrepo, Rodriguez-Rodriguez, or even  
18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8), the statutory provision on which those 
decisions were based.  Instead, its analysis turns on 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2243—a distinct provision that both Restrepo and Rodriguez-
Rodriguez rejected as an interpretive guide—as well as statu-
tory and contextual clues that those decisions discounted or ig-
nored.  So in the end, the Majority looks beyond Restrepo and 
finds a knowledge requirement by adopting the interpretive ap-
proach of Esquivel-Quintana. 
I would reach that result more directly by holding that Es-
quivel-Quintana abrogates the bases on which Restrepo rested.  
Under the approach set out in Esquivel-Quintana, before deem-
ing a provision ambiguous under Chevron, courts must engage 
in vigorous textual and contextual statutory analysis tailored to 
the precise interpretive question presented.  That approach is 
impossible to square with Restrepo, which ignored or dis-
counted sources of statutory meaning on which Esquivel-Quin-
tana relied, assessed ambiguity at the broadest level, and re-
quired deference to Rodriguez-Rodriguez for all future inter-
pretive questions involving § 1101(a)(43)(A).  Restrepo is a 
relic of an era when deference was far more reflexive and au-
tomatic than it is today and, after Esquivel-Quintana, we can 
no longer follow Restrepo in uncritically relying on Rodriguez-








I tackle these issues in three steps.  I first highlight the fun-
damental inconsistencies between Esquivel-Quintana and Re-
strepo, which reveal that the latter decision’s assessment of 
ambiguity was erroneous.  I then explore the case law on Ro-
driguez-Rodriguez after Esquivel-Quintana to show why I 
view the issue as unsettled.  Finally, I explain why the conclu-
sion that § 1101(a)(43)(A) requires knowledge—with which I 
wholeheartedly agree—flows not from Restrepo or Rodriguez-
Rodriguez, but from Esquivel-Quintana. 
I. 
The Majority ably summarizes the contours of Esquivel-
Quintana’s holding.  I agree Esquivel-Quintana resolved only 
one aspect of the generic federal definition of “sexual abuse of 
a minor”: the meaning of “minor” “in the context of statutory 
rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely 
on the age of the participants.”  137 S. Ct. at 1568.  The Court 
did not set down an all-encompassing definition of “sexual 
abuse of a minor”; in fact, it expressly reserved interpretive 
questions not before it.  See, e.g., id. at 1572.  So I join the 
Majority in rejecting the argument, which the BIA endorsed,2 
 
2 The BIA “agree[d] with [Cabeda]” about the contents of 
the new definition and cited the pages of Cabeda’s brief laying 
out that definition.  A.R. 4.  As those pages reveal, the defini-
tion Cabeda put forward, and that the BIA accepted, was “the 
engaging in sexual contact with a person who is below a spec-








that Esquivel-Quintana created a new, comprehensive generic 
federal definition to be applied in future cases.  So far, so easy. 
What is not so easy, though, is the distinct question whether 
Esquivel-Quintana’s analysis—the sources and evidence the 
Court considered and the order in which the Court considered 
them—undermines Restrepo’s analysis of § 1101(a)(43)(A) or 
its choice to defer to the BIA’s interpretation in Rodriguez-Ro-
driguez.  The Majority acknowledges that more complicated 
question, observing that there is “some tension between” Re-
strepo and Esquivel-Quintana.  Maj. Op. 12; accord id. at 13 
n.4.  I see that tension as irreconcilable.  In multiple respects, 
the statutory analysis of Esquivel-Quintana is entirely incon-
sistent with that of Restrepo.  Indeed, Esquivel-Quintana has 
 
or mental or physical incapacity.”  A.R. 15 (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1569).   
But the idea that the quoted language established a new ge-
neric definition borders on the fatuous.  That language, which 
came from Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law, see Es-
quivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1569, was just one of many 
pieces of evidence the Court considered en route to deciding 
the age of consent for a subset of statutory rape offenses.  See 
id. at 1568–72.  Nothing in the Court’s opinion even hints at an 
endorsement of that language as a definitive encapsulation of 
the generic federal definition.  Nor, contrary to Cabeda’s argu-
ment, is there any evidence to suggest that by quoting the 
phrase “sexual contact” as part of the dictionary definition, the 
Court meant to silently adopt the definition of that phrase from 








so undermined that analysis that I believe Restrepo is no longer 
good law. 
Under the first step of Chevron, we may “defer to [an] 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute only if the text 
of the statute is unclear and we cannot discern congressional 
intent by utilizing various tools of statutory construction.”  
Quinteros v. Att’y Gen., 945 F.3d 772, 784 (3d Cir. 2019) (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted).  But Restrepo put 
the cart before the horse, signaling that deference was appro-
priate before engaging in statutory interpretation.  What’s 
more, Restrepo’s eventual statutory analysis cannot withstand 
scrutiny after Esquivel-Quintana, which demanded a much 
more targeted approach and which took a contrary position on 
essentially all the sources of statutory meaning Restrepo con-
sidered.  Viewed through the lens of Esquivel-Quintana, Re-
strepo erred in concluding that § 1101(a)(43)(A) was across-
the-board ambiguous under Chevron. 
A. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of Esquivel-Quintana 
cannot be gleaned only from reading the Court’s opinion.  As 
it came to the Court, Esquivel-Quintana was very much a case 
about Chevron deference in general and about the wisdom of 
deferring to the BIA’s reliance on a procedural statute like  
§ 3509(a)(8) in particular.3  See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 
35–48, Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (No. 16-54), 2016 
 
3 As noted by the Majority, § 3509 deals with the rights of 
child victims and witnesses in federal criminal proceedings.  








WL 7384847; Brief for the Respondent at 36–55, Esquivel-
Quintana, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (No. 16-54), 2017 WL 345128; Re-
ply Brief for Petitioner at 17–23, Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. 
1562 (No. 16-54), 2017 WL 632460.  Yet for all the space it 
commanded in the briefing, Chevron ended up relegated to a 
short paragraph at the tail end of the Court’s opinion.  After 
reviewing the text along with dictionary definitions, statutory 
context, related federal statutes, and analogous state laws, the 
Court found “no need” to resort to Chevron deference at all 
“because the statute, read in context, unambiguously fore-
close[d] the [BIA]’s interpretation.”  Esquivel-Quintana,  
137 S. Ct. at 1572.  In other words, when faced with a question 
about the phrase “sexual abuse of a minor,” the Court treated 
Chevron as a canon of last resort, to be used if—but only if—
the Court could not dispel ambiguity through a robust applica-
tion of all the tools in its statutory toolkit.  See also Epic Sys. 
Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (noting that “Chev-
ron leaves the stage” where the “court, employing traditional 
tools of statutory construction,” can discern the meaning of the 
contested provision (citations omitted)). 
Not so with Restrepo.  In analyzing “sexual abuse of a mi-
nor,” we first noted that, unlike other aggravated felonies listed 
in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), § 1101(a)(43)(A) 
contains neither cross-references to other statutory provisions 
nor explanatory parentheticals about the nature of the offense.  
Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 792.  Then—before looking to any other 
textual or contextual clues—we suggested that “Congress 
ha[d] explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,” “intend[ing] 
for the BIA to utilize its expertise to define the phrase.”  Id. at 
793 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 








further statutory analysis—we concluded that because  
§ 1101(a)(43)(A) lacks an express definition and cross-refer-
ences, its “precise definition . . . is most assuredly not clear and 
unambiguous.”4  Id.   
Put plainly, in Restrepo we waved the white flag of ambi-
guity far too readily, and without performing the rigorous anal-
ysis Esquivel-Quintana demands.  But that is not Restrepo’s 
only flaw. 
B. 
Esquivel-Quintana also clarified that in assessing ambigu-
ity under step one of Chevron, courts must define the interpre-
tive question narrowly.  Said differently, courts must ask not 
whether a statute is ambiguous in general, but whether it is am-
biguous as to the specific legal issue in the case.  That, too, is 
impossible to square with Restrepo, which approached the is-
sue of ambiguity practically in the abstract. 
In analyzing the phrase “sexual abuse of a minor,” the 
Court in Esquivel-Quintana did not trouble itself with whether 
 
4 We revealed we were jumping the gun on ambiguity in 
other ways, too.  Among Restrepo’s brief statutory analysis is 
a footnote discussing the legislative history, which we under-
stood to suggest Congress had intended § 1101(a)(43)(A) to be 
read “expansive[ly].”  617 F.3d at 795 n.6.  We considered that 
reading consistent “with the structure of § 1101(a)(43)(A)”—
but also “with the BIA’s interpretation” of the phrase.  Id.  Ac-
cordingly, it appears Rodriguez-Rodriguez colored what 
should have been an independent analysis of statutory meaning 








every element of the federal generic offense was clear from the 
text.  Instead, it limited its interpretive task to the specific cat-
egory of crimes it faced: “statutory rape offenses that criminal-
ize sexual intercourse based solely on the age of the partici-
pants.”  Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1568.  Because it did 
so, the Court could assess § 1101(a)(43)(A) through an appro-
priately tailored lens and conclude that the generic age of con-
sent, at least where the statutory rape offense is based only on 
age (rather than, say, a relationship of trust between the adult 
and the minor), is sixteen.  Id. at 1569–72.  That narrow focus 
allowed the Court to avoid the broader dispute about whether 
it was appropriate to defer to a BIA interpretation based on a 
procedural statute like § 3509.  See id. at 1572.   
Since Esquivel-Quintana, the Court has reaffirmed its en-
dorsement of this approach.  Take Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. 
Ct. 2105 (2018), a case involving the INA’s “stop-time rule,” 
which if triggered ends a noncitizen’s period of continuous 
physical presence for purposes of cancellation of removal.  Id. 
at 2109.  As in Esquivel-Quintana, in Pereira the issue of 
Chevron deference was hotly contested and commanded sub-
stantial space in the briefing.  See Brief for Petitioner at 24–55, 
Pereira, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (No. 17-459), 2018 WL 1083742; 
Brief for the Respondent at 21–52, Pereira, 138 S. Ct. 2105 
(No. 17-459), 2018 WL 1557067; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 
3–23, Pereira, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (No. 17-459), 2018 WL 
1792078.  Yet in its opinion, the Court criticized the parties for 
approaching the interpretive question too “broadly.”  Pereira, 
138 S. Ct. at 2113.  Rather than asking whether “all ‘items 
listed’ in [8 U.S.C.] § 1229(a)(1)” must be included for a doc-
ument to qualify as a “notice to appear” triggering the stop-








item missing from Pereira’s notice: “the date and time of [the] 
removal proceedings.”  Id.  Once it had sufficiently “narrowe[d] 
[the] question” presented, the Court found it “need not resort 
to Chevron deference” at all.  Id.  Instead, after reviewing the 
statutory text, neighboring provisions, and “common sense,” 
id. at 2114–16, it concluded the stop-time provision “ha[d] sup-
plied a clear and unambiguous answer to the interpretive ques-
tion at hand,” id. at 2113 (emphasis added).  Once again, there-
fore, the Court made clear that statutory ambiguity—without 
which deference to an agency is inappropriate—must be as-
sessed through the lens of the precise dispute.  See also Niel-
sen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 963–65 (2019) (resolving an in-
terpretive dispute related to an INA provision governing the 
apprehension and detention of noncitizens based on a close 
analysis of the text and without citing Chevron, even though 
the parties had sharply litigated the deference issue); SAS Inst. 
Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (declining to ad-
dress the parties’ Chevron arguments because, “after applying 
traditional tools of interpretation” to the specific question pre-
sented, the Court was “left with no uncertainty that could war-
rant deference”); Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2067, 2074 (2018) (similar); Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 
1066, 1080 n.3 (2019) (similar). 
Now consider Restrepo.  The specific question presented 
was a narrow one: whether inappropriate contact with a mi-
nor’s sensitive areas “through her clothing” qualified as sexual 
abuse.  See 617 F.3d at 800.  But you would hardly know it 
from reading the opinion because the first time we grappled 
with that specific issue occurred well over halfway in, id. at 
799—and long after we had deemed § 1101(a)(43)(A) ambig-








the highest level of generality, focusing on the lack of cross-
references and explanatory parentheticals, id. at 792–93, and 
on general clues drawn from surrounding provisions and con-
temporaneous legislation, id. at 793–95.  It is no surprise that 
such a general review of the statute “le[ft] us in a state of inter-
pretive uncertainty,” id. at 795:  Without the benefit of deci-
sions like Esquivel-Quintana and Pereira, we hadn’t defined 
the precise question we were meant to answer.   
We have, since Restrepo, gotten it right, stating that we 
must assess the ambiguity of a statute “with respect to the spe-
cific issue of law in the case.”  Da Silva v. Att’y Gen., 948 F.3d 
629, 634 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., 
S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 549 (3d Cir. 2018) (Chev-
ron step one requires courts to narrow in on “the precise ques-
tion at issue” (citation omitted)).  Had we followed that path in 
Restrepo, we may or may not have found ambiguity over 
whether “sexual abuse of a minor” encompasses “inappropriate 
touching of a minor through the clothing,” 617 F.3d at 799—
but we would not have concluded that § 1101(a)(43)(A) was 
ambiguous across the board, and consequently we could not 
have purported to require “defin[ing] sexual abuse of a minor 
by reference to § 3509(a)” in all future cases, id. at 796.  After 
Esquivel-Quintana, we must revisit that misstep. 
C. 
Finally, and apart from those issues about the timing and 
framing of the ambiguity inquiry, Esquivel-Quintana has re-
vealed that Restrepo’s statutory analysis was deeply flawed.  In 
five respects, we either misinterpreted or ignored key clues 








First, Restrepo discounted a longstanding “rule of statutory 
construction”: that “identical words used in different parts of 
the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”  Dep’t of 
Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994) 
(citation omitted).  Congress added “sexual abuse of a minor” 
to the INA’s list of aggravated felonies in 1996.  Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 321(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
627 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)).  As part of the 
same omnibus legislation, Congress also amended the code 
provision criminalizing sexual abuse of a minor.  Amber 
Hagerman Child Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
div. A, tit. I, § 121, subsec. 7(c), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-31 (cod-
ified at 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a)).  So Restrepo invoked the same-
act canon, urging us to interpret “sexual abuse of a minor” un-
der § 1101(a)(43)(A) in line with § 2243.  See Restrepo,  
617 F.3d at 793.  But we rejected that canon as “inapplicable” 
to omnibus legislation, concluding—without citing any prece-
dent for this proposition—that terms used “in separate and dis-
tinct statutes” were not subject to the rule.  Id. at 793–94. 
Esquivel-Quintana took a contrary approach.  There, the 
Court leaned heavily on § 2243, which it described as “[a] 
closely related federal statute” providing valuable “evidence 
[of] the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor.”  
137 S. Ct. at 1570.  It did so not just because § 2243 “contains 
the only definition of that phrase in the United States Code,” 
but also because Congress had amended § 2243 “in the same 
omnibus law that added sexual abuse of a minor to the INA.”  
Id.  As the Court explained, the temporal proximity between 
revisions to § 1101(a)(43)(A) and § 2243 “provide[s] stron[g] 








consistently.  See id. (second and third alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Here, the con-
flict could hardly be more evident:  Restrepo held inapplicable 
a canon of statutory construction that Esquivel-Quintana em-
ployed in interpreting the same provision. 
Second, Restrepo also neglected another longstanding 
canon: noscitur a sociis, under which “a word is known by the 
company it keeps.”  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 
1085 (2015).  Here, the words are “sexual abuse of a minor,” 
and the company they keep is sinister indeed: “murder” and 
“rape.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).  Invoking noscitur a sociis, 
Restrepo argued that the severity of murder and rape should 
inform our interpretation of sexual abuse of a minor.  See Re-
strepo, 617 F.3d at 794.  We rejected that argument as incon-
sistent with “the broader context of the legislation at issue,” id., 
which—looking beyond § 1101(a)(43)(A) to unrelated parts of 
the INA—we characterized as an effort “to expand both the 
protections afforded to minors and the penalties applicable to 
aliens who commit crimes against minors.”  Id.  (More on that 
in a moment.)  We otherwise did not explore how the phrase’s 
proximity to murder and rape should affect our analysis. 
Once again, Esquivel-Quintana revealed the error in our 
thinking.  The Court emphasized that “the INA lists sexual 
abuse of a minor in the same subparagraph as ‘murder’ and 
‘rape,’” which are “among the most heinous crimes it defines 
as aggravated felonies.”  Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1570 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)).  For the Court, the nosci-
tur a sociis canon was highly useful because it revealed “that 
sexual abuse of a minor encompasses only especially egre-








missing from Restrepo—it is directly contrary to how Restrepo 
characterized § 1101(a)(43)(A).   
Third, Restrepo ignored another valuable contextual clue 
about the contours of § 1101(a)(43)(A).  Restrepo emphasized 
that when Congress added sexual abuse of a minor to the list 
of aggravated felonies, “it simultaneously amended the INA to 
classify crimes of domestic violence, stalking, child abuse, 
child neglect, and child abandonment as grounds for deporta-
bility.”  617 F.3d at 794.  We took that to mean that “Congress 
intended to implement comprehensive protections for minor 
victims that were expansive in nature.”  Id. at 795 n.6.  That 
“expansive” reading was critical to our analysis, as it supported 
our conclusion that it “would be counterintuitive” to adopt an 
interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(A) that excluded certain state 
offenses.  See id. at 795. 
Restrepo’s expansive reading is nowhere to be found in Es-
quivel-Quintana.  In fact, after a thorough review of the statu-
tory text and context, the Court concluded the opposite.  Sec-
tion 1101(a)(43)(A), the Court emphasized, is “an ‘aggravated’ 
offense,” meaning “one made worse or more serious by [the] 
circumstances.”  Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1570 (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted).  And unlike the 
broader grounds for removal discussed in Restrepo, sexual 
abuse of a minor is an aggravated felony carrying the addi-
tional, and severe, sanction of ineligibility for cancellation of 
removal.  That signal was a key reason the Court concluded 
that § 1101(a)(43)(A) “encompasses only especially egregious 
felonies,” id., but unfortunately it is one we missed in Restrepo. 
Fourth, Restrepo misunderstood the role state criminal of-








like § 1101(a)(43)(A).  Restrepo was convicted of a New Jer-
sey statute criminalizing “an act of sexual contact,” N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:14-3(a), which includes intentional touching of in-
timate areas “through clothing,” id. § 2C:14-1(d).  But § 2243’s 
actus reus is a “sexual act,” 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a), which is de-
fined as intentional touching “not through the clothing,” id.  
§ 2246(2)(D).  In Restrepo, we signaled our concern that rely-
ing on § 2243 would exclude the New Jersey offense from the 
generic federal definition, something we felt would conflict 
with the “expansive” reading discussed above.  See 617 F.3d 
at 794–95 nn.6 & 7.  So instead we turned to § 3509, whose 
definition includes intentional touching “through clothing,”  
8 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(9)(A).  See Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 799–800.   
Esquivel-Quintana reveals we were wrong to let the state 
crime drive our interpretation of the generic federal offense.  
Indeed, the government tried something similar in Esquivel-
Quintana:  Faced with a state statute criminalizing consensual 
sex between 21- and a 17-year-old, 137 S. Ct. at 1567, it of-
fered up a definition broad enough to capture the statute, 
namely that sexual abuse covers sexual activity “directed at a 
person younger than 18.”  Id. at 1569 (citation omitted).  But 
the Court criticized the government for “turn[ing] the categor-
ical approach on its head by defining the generic federal of-
fense of sexual abuse of a minor as whatever is illegal under 
the particular law of the State where the defendant was con-
victed.”  Id. at 1570.  Under that conception of the categorical 
approach, the Court explained, “there is no ‘generic’ definition 
at all.”  Id.   
Further, although the Court ultimately “look[ed] to state crim-








an independent view on the meaning of § 1101(a)(43)(A) and, 
just as critical, only after a comprehensive cross-jurisdictional 
survey.  Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1571–72; see id. at 
1573 app.  That survey allowed the Court to confirm its under-
standing of the statute’s meaning by reference to a majority of 
jurisdictions—even though its conclusion excluded over a 
dozen states’ laws from the generic definition, id. at 1576 app.  
Although we referred to a few states’ laws in Restrepo,  
617 F.3d at 795 n.7 (Pennsylvania and Delaware); see id. at 
799 n.16 (citing, but not analyzing, sexual-abuse-of-a-minor 
analogs from five states and the District of Columbia), we 
stopped far short of the cross-jurisdictional analysis used in Es-
quivel-Quintana.   
We are not alone in having misunderstood the import and 
role of state crimes in analyzing a generic federal offense.  See, 
e.g., Bedolla-Zarate v. Sessions, 892 F.3d 1137, 1141 n.4 (10th 
Cir. 2018) (noting that Esquivel-Quintana abrogated circuit 
precedent on looking to state criminal statutes).  But after Es-
quivel-Quintana, we should not hesitate to ask whether we in-
appropriately “turn[ed] the categorical approach on its head,” 
137 S. Ct. at 1570, in crafting § 1101(a)(43)(A) to capture the 
offense before us.   
Fifth, Restrepo unnecessarily painted itself into a corner.  
Restrepo portrayed an interpretive dilemma in which it would 
have to choose either § 2243 or § 3509 as the definitive lodestar 
for “sexual abuse of a minor.”  Choosing § 2243, we con-
cluded, would exclude too many state offenses from the ge-
neric federal definition.  Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 795.  So instead 
we chose § 3509(a)—and purported to do so for all future cases 








But Esquivel-Quintana has shown that to be a false choice.  
There, although the Court relied heavily on § 2243, it did so 
only because it judged § 2243 to be a sensible guide for the 
problem it was facing.  And it made clear it was not adopting 
§ 2243 “as . . . the complete or exclusive definition” of  
§ 1101(a)(43)(A).  Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1571.  If 
we had had the benefit of Esquivel-Quintana’s guidance, we 
would have understood that our choice between the two 
sources of statutory meaning was neither as absolute nor as 
consequential as we made it seem. 
D. 
Although the Majority recognizes that “Esquivel-Quintana 
reflects . . . a more searching and nuanced approach” than the 
one we took in Restrepo, Maj. Op. 13 n.4, it attributes those 
differences to “shifting interpretive methodologies [that] are 
not usually viewed as carrying the force of stare decisis.”  Id.  
I disagree in four respects. 
First, I cannot help but note the irony in embracing this prop-
osition when the delta between my and my colleagues’ views 
comes down to “interpretive methodologies” on both sides.  If 
all that were binding on us were Restrepo’s substantive hold-
ing—namely, that a statute criminalizing the “intentional touch-
ing . . . , either directly or through clothing,” of a minor’s sensi-
tive areas “for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the vic-
tim or sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the actor” quali-
fies as “sexual abuse of a minor” under § 1101(a)(43)(A), see 
617 F.3d at 800 & n.18 (citation omitted)—we would be in 
complete alignment about how to resolve this appeal.  It is only 
what Restrepo had to say about its interpretive method—i.e., 








to § 3509(a)” as “a guide,” id. at 796 n.10 (citation omitted)—
that is at issue between us.  In essence, the Majority dismisses 
Esquivel-Quintana’s contributions as merely providing inter-
pretive guidance but declines to apply the same lens to Re-
strepo.  But “what is sauce for the goose is normally sauce for 
the gander,” Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 
1418 (2016), and there is no reason why our own prior views 
on interpretive methods—especially views that are incon-
sistent with current doctrine, see Maj. Op. 13 n.4—would con-
tinue to demand adherence when the Supreme Court’s more 
recent views would not.   
Second, the rule on which the Majority relies is, in my view, 
far narrower than as described.  My colleagues assert, for in-
stance, that “the Supreme Court ‘typically avoids methodolog-
ical stare decisis,’” Maj. Op. 14 n.4 (quoting Am. Farm Bureau 
Fed’n v. U.S. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 307 n.8 (3d Cir. 2015)), and 
to be sure, some Justices have suggested that statements in [the 
Court’s] opinions about . . . generally applicable interpretive 
methods, like the proper weight to afford historical practice in 
constitutional cases or legislative history in statutory cases,” 
are not entitled to the “full force” of stare decisis, e.g., Kisor v. 
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2444 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring 
in the judgment).  But that principle addresses only the extent 
to which “future Justices” are bound by methodology in the 
Supreme Court’s prior decisions—that is, it addresses only 
“horizontal” stare decisis.  Id. at 2444.  And that distinction is 
critical:  Whatever might be said of how the Court chooses to 
treat “its own precedents,” “[b]y contrast, vertical stare decisis 
is absolute, as it must be in a hierarchical system with ‘one su-








(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (emphasis added 
and omitted) (citation omitted).    
Nor have we held that, as a Court of Appeals, we are free 
to discard the Supreme Court’s instructions on “interpretive 
methodology” as not a “form of ‘law’” that binds us, Maj. 
Op. 14 n.4 (quoting Am. Farm Bureau, 792 F.3d at 307 n.8).  
What my colleagues omit in discussing American Farm Bu-
reau is that there, although we outlined an academic debate 
about so-called methodological stare decisis, we concluded we 
had “no occasion to explore further the contours of th[at] de-
bate.”  792 F.3d at 307 n.8.  Instead, we applied the interpretive 
method called for by precedent.  See id.  The Majority has ap-
parently opted to embrace one side of that debate, but we as a 
Court did not do so in American Farm Bureau or any other 
decision of which I am aware. 
Indeed, the “sea change in our jurisprudence,” Maj. Op. 15 
n.6, if anything, would be if the Courts of Appeals were sud-
denly free to discard as nonbinding the Supreme Court’s in-
structions on “interpretive methodologies,” id. at 13 n.4 (cita-
tion omitted)—for instance, that we may defer to an agency’s 
interpretation only if the statute “is ambiguous” and the inter-
pretation “reasonable,” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005), or that we 
may apply the rule of lenity “only . . . after consulting tradi-
tional canons of statutory construction,” United States v. 
Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994).  What are those if not “inter-
pretive methodologies” addressing how to understand civil and 
criminal enactments?—and yet we follow them just as we fol-
low all other binding statements from the High Court, see, e.g., 








2019) (Chevron); United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 455 
(3d Cir. 2001) (lenity).   
Third, perhaps searching for a limiting principle, the Ma-
jority suggests we can ignore methodological guidance from 
the Supreme Court “when the decisions employing [such guid-
ance] do not purport to overrule past precedent.”  Maj. Op. 13–
14 n.4.  Yet it is unclear exactly what “past precedent” the Es-
quivel-Quintana Court was supposed to note it was overruling.  
After all, Esquivel-Quintana was the Court’s first occasion to 
address § 1101(a)(43)(A).  And surely the Majority does not 
mean to suggest that the Supreme Court, to guarantee that its 
dictates will be followed, must canvas the case law of this Cir-
cuit and every other Court of Appeals and identify each possi-
ble point of abrogation.  That suggestion would all but erase 
the very concept of abrogation, restricting changes in circuit 
law to those occasions when our decisions are expressly over-
ruled.  But that has never been our practice.  To the contrary, 
“[a] panel of this Court may reevaluate the holding of a prior 
panel which conflicts with intervening Supreme Court prece-
dent,” even if only “impliedly.”  In re Krebs, 527 F.3d 82, 83–
84 (3d Cir. 2008).  Here, however, the Majority turns vertical 
stare decisis on its head, elevating a concededly outmoded 
panel decision over a contrary and more recent statement from 
the Supreme Court.   
Fourth, the fundamental inconsistencies between Esquivel-
Quintana and Restrepo cannot be swept aside as if they were 
purely “methodological,” Maj. Op. 13 n.4.  As discussed in de-
tail above, see supra 10–16, Esquivel-Quintana has revealed 
Restrepo to be flawed not only in its methodology, but also in 








and meaning, particularly the expansive reading of the statute 
on which Restrepo (and Rodriguez-Rodriguez) so heavily de-
pended.  Those substantive conflicts fall beyond the methodo-
logical-stare-decisis argument, whatever its merits, and go un-
addressed by my esteemed colleagues. 
*          *          * 
In brief, a close look at Esquivel-Quintana reveals that Re-
strepo found ambiguity in § 1101(a)(43)(A) too quickly, too 
generally, and by ignoring or misinterpreting valuable evi-
dence of statutory meaning.  And as a result, Restrepo errone-
ously suggested that under Chevron step one, it would always 
be appropriate to refer to the BIA’s interpretation in Rodriguez-
Rodriguez.5 
 
5 Because in my view § 1101(a)(43)(A) unambiguously re-
quires a mens rea of knowledge with respect to the proscribed 
sexual conduct, I take no position on whether the BIA’s view 
in Rodriguez-Rodriguez is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute,” Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 
263, 271 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted), either in terms of 
the statute’s text or its “design and structure . . . as a whole,” 
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) 
(citation omitted).   
I note, though, that Rodriguez-Rodriguez suffers from sev-
eral of the flaws that Esquivel-Quintana has revealed in Re-
strepo.  Like Restrepo, Rodriguez-Rodriguez hinged on an “ex-
pansi[ve]” view of § 1101(a)(43)(A), see 22 I. & N. Dec. at 
994, one that ignored multiple pieces of evidence “suggest[ing] 








As a result, I cannot agree this is simply a matter of “Chev-
ron deference[’s] [being] unnecessary in one specific instance” 
and not in another, Maj. Op. 12.  The Court’s analysis in Es-
quivel-Quintana not only implicates, but directly undermines, 
everything we said and did in Restrepo.  That is more than 
enough to “‘undercut the decisional basis’ of Restrepo,” id. at 
12–13 (quoting West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 93 (3d Cir. 1983)), 
and accordingly we are not bound by that decision’s suggestion 
that we must uncritically defer to § 3509(a)(8) in all cases in-
volving § 1101(a)(43)(A). 
 
egregious felonies,” Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1570.  
And, again like Restrepo, Rodriguez-Rodriguez seems to have 
reverse-engineered the generic federal definition to fit the state 
offense, see 22 I. & N. Dec. at 995–96, thereby “turn[ing] the 
categorical approach on its head,” Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1570.  Although it is possible that Rodriguez-Rodriguez’s 
bottom-line conclusion, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 993, that “sexual 
abuse of a minor” encompasses non-contact indecent exposure 
offenses was correct, future panels of this Court faced with 
genuine ambiguity may have to decide whether Rodriguez-Ro-
driguez offers up a reasonable interpretation.  If so, they will 
also have to confront the fact that Rodriguez-Rodriguez looked 
to § 3509(a)(8) only as a “guide,” id. at 996, and only in one 
specific context.  Cf., e.g., Amos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 512, 520 
(4th Cir. 2015) (holding that Rodriguez-Rodriguez is not enti-










My learned colleagues view the idea that Restrepo’s defer-
ence to Rodriguez-Rodriguez survives Esquivel-Quintana as 
something of a fait accompli, which we and other Courts of 
Appeals have already decided.  In my view, neither we nor, 
with one exception, any other circuit has reached that conclu-
sion, and in fact most of our sister circuits’ case law suggests 
we must revisit Restrepo in light of Esquivel-Quintana. 
A. 
Relying on Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Attorney General,  
884 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2018), the Majority infers, as a general 
matter, that “we have already taken the position . . . that Es-
quivel-Quintana speaks specifically to the question of statutory 
rape, not more broadly to the definition of the generic offense 
of sexual abuse of a minor.”  Maj. Op. 15.  I do not believe 
Mondragon-Gonzalez sweeps so broadly; indeed, that case did 
not involve the aggravated felony of “sexual abuse of a minor” 
at all. 
In Mondragon-Gonzalez, the issue was whether the peti-
tioner’s Pennsylvania conviction of unlawful contact with a 
minor constituted a “crime of child abuse” under 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  884 F.3d at 157.  After Esquivel-Quintana 
came down, the petitioner argued that “a child for purposes  
of . . . the term ‘crime of child abuse’ means someone under 
the age of 16,” and not (as the BIA had concluded) anyone un-
der eighteen.  See id. at 160.  In rejecting that argument, we 
emphasized Esquivel-Quintana’s limits, noting that the Court 
had addressed only the “sexual abuse of a minor” aggravated 
felony provision.  Id.  Unsurprisingly, we concluded that “Es-








turning on the meaning of the word “child” in the statutory 
phrase “crime of child abuse.”  There is little that is “notable,” 
Maj. Op. 15 n.6, in that decision; to the contrary, the surprise 
would have been if a panel addressing an entirely unrelated 
INA provision had launched into an unnecessary analysis of 
whether Esquivel-Quintana had abrogated unrelated prece-
dent. 
Because nothing in Mondragon-Gonzalez addressed the ef-
fect of Esquivel-Quintana’s reasoning on Restrepo’s statutory 
analysis, that issue remains open in our Circuit. 
B. 
To the extent we may draw wisdom from our sister circuits, 
they generally favor revisiting Restrepo’s deference to Rodri-
guez-Rodriguez in the aftermath of Esquivel-Quintana. 
Many of those circuits reject outright the notion that Rodri-
guez-Rodriguez is entitled to deference.  Several reached that 
conclusion before Esquivel-Quintana.  See Estrada-Espi-
noza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc) (holding that Rodriguez-Rodriguez, which looked to  
§ 3509(a)(8) only as a “guide” and which did not identify de-
fined elements of the generic federal offense, did not set down 
a definitive interpretation entitled to Chevron deference), over-
ruled on other grounds by United States v. Aguila-Montes de 
Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Amos v. Lynch, 
790 F.3d 512, 519–20 (4th Cir. 2015) (following Estrada-Es-
pinoza); Rangel-Perez v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 591, 598–601 (10th 
Cir. 2016) (same), abrogated in other part by Esquivel-Quin-
tana, 137 S. Ct. 1562; see also Contreras v. Holder, 754 F.3d 








Rodriguez’s definition may “not [be] a reasonable one”).  An-
other has implicitly joined the fold since.  See Garcia-Ur-
bano v. Sessions, 890 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2018) (noting that 
the BIA has “interpreted the phrase [‘sexual abuse of a minor’] 
through case-by-case adjudication,” not a definitive interpreta-
tion).  In the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, 
therefore, there is simply no Restrepo analog for those courts 
to reconsider after Esquivel-Quintana.   
And in the few circuits with a Restrepo analog—the Sec-
ond, see Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2001), 
Sixth, see Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1026–
27 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d in part, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017), and 
Seventh, see Velasco-Giron v. Holder, 773 F.3d 774, 776 (7th 
Cir. 2014)—the reaction to Esquivel-Quintana has been any-
thing but uniform.  To be sure, in Correa-Diaz v. Sessions,  
881 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2018), the court adhered to pre-Es-
quivel-Quintana precedent deferring to Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 
reasoning that the Supreme Court’s decision made Chevron 
deference inappropriate only “as to [the] one precise question” 
presented there.  Id. at 527–28.  So the Seventh Circuit, at least, 
is firmly in the Majority’s camp. 
The same cannot be said, though, for the Second Circuit.  
In Acevedo v. Barr, 943 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2019), the court 
noted that although Esquivel-Quintana “avoided any issue of 
Chevron deference with respect to . . . § 3509(a)(8)” as to the 
issue before it, “it also did not foreclose the BIA’s use of that 
statute in other instances,” and thus circuit precedent deferring 
to Rodriguez-Rodriguez “survives Esquivel-Quintana.”  Id. at 
623.  That is fair, as far as it goes.  But Acevedo then side-








ranging analysis of “the structure of the INA, the inherent egre-
gious nature of an aggravated felony, and closely-related stat-
utes,” id. at 624—including § 2243, which Esquivel-Quintana 
had cited and which Rodriguez-Rodriguez had rejected.  In es-
sence, ongoing deference to Rodriguez-Rodriguez was more 
honored in the breach than in the observance. 
The Sixth Circuit’s view is yet unclear.  But in Keeley v. 
Whitaker, 910 F.3d 878 (6th Cir. 2018), a case involving the 
nearby aggravated felony of “rape,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), 
the court showed both sensitivity to the need for rigorous stat-
utory analysis and reluctance to give unwarranted deference to 
the BIA.  It rejected the BIA’s interpretation that “rape” in-
cludes digital penetration, reasoning that the BIA had given 
short shrift to statutory language in order to sweep more state 
laws into the aggravated felony category.  See Keeley, 910 F.3d 
at 883–84.  That criticism echoed Esquivel-Quintana’s caution 
that the government cannot “turn[] the categorical approach on 
its head by defining the generic federal offense . . . as whatever 
is illegal under the particular law of the State where the defend-
ant was convicted,” 137 S. Ct. at 1570.  And, as in Esquivel-
Quintana, Keeley found “no need” to resort to Chevron defer-
ence after fully exhausting the tools of statutory construction.  
910 F.3d at 885–86 (citation omitted).  So although Rodriguez-
Rodriguez’s vitality in the Sixth Circuit is uncertain, Keeley ar-
guably laid the groundwork for independent statutory interpre-
tation beyond § 3509(a)(8). 
To review:  The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Correa-Diaz, 
to date, remains an outlier.  Of the three Courts of Appeals to 
have followed Restrepo’s path before Esquivel-Quintana, one 








side; and the third has yet to return to the issue but has signaled 
a muscular view of courts’ responsibility to engage in statutory 
interpretation before deferring to the BIA.  And in five other 
circuits, Rodriguez-Rodriguez commands no deference at all.  
That is the conclusion compelled by Esquivel-Quintana in this 
context and the position we should adopt today. 
III. 
To follow the course the Court has charted, we must assess 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A) through the lens of “the least of the acts crim-
inalized by the state statute.”  Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 
1568.  The Majority does so by focusing on the fact that invol-
untary deviate sexual intercourse under Pennsylvania law has 
a minimum mens rea of recklessness as to the proscribed sex-
ual conduct.6  18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 3101, 3123(a)(7); see id.  
 
6 Although I take no issue with this approach, I note another 
feature of the Pennsylvania offense: that it can be committed 
by “penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of an-
other person with a foreign object for any purpose other than 
good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures.”  
18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3101; see id. § 3123(a).  That feature sets Penn-
sylvania law apart from that of other states, almost all of which 
define such inappropriate sexual contact in terms of a specific 
“intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade a person or to 
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of a person.”  E.g., Alaska 
Stat. § 26.05.890(h)(5)(B); accord Ala. Code § 13A-6-60(3); 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1419(D)(1)(a); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-
14-101(11); Cal. Penal Code § 288(a); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-
403(2)(c); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-65(3); Del. Code Ann.  
tit. 11, § 1356(4); D.C. Code § 22-3001(9); Fla. Stat.  









Stat. § 712-1210; Idaho Code § 18-1507(1)(c); 720 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 5/11-0.1; Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b); Iowa Code  
§ 709.8(1); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5506(a)(1); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 510.010(7); La. Stat. Ann. § 14:81(A); Me. Stat. tit. 17-
A, § 251(1)(C)(3); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-
301(d)(1)(v); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.145c(1)(g); Miss. Code 
Ann. § 97-5-23(1); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.010(6); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 45-5-701(9); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-318(5); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 201.520(4)–(5); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-A:1(IV); 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-1(d); N.Y. Penal Law § 130.00(3); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1(a)(1); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-
02(5); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.01(B); Okla. Stat. tit. 44, 
§ 920(F)(1)(c); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.305(6); 11 R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 11-37-1(7); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655(C); S.D. Codified 
Laws § 22-22-7.1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-501(13); Tex. Pe-
nal Code Ann. § 21.01(2); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(2); 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 2602(a)(1); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-
67.10(6); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.010(2); W. Va. Code § 61-
8B-1(6); Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(a); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-
301(a)(vii)(A); see 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3101 (defining “[i]ndecent 
contact” as “[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts 
of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual 
desire, in any person”); id. § 3126(a)(8) (criminalizing inde-
cent contact by certain defendants with a “complainant . . . less 
than 16 years of age”); see also 9 Guam Code Ann.  
§ 25.10(a)(8); V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 1699(d).  And many of 
our sister circuits, interpreting § 1101(a)(43)(A) or similarly 
worded sentencing enhancements, have concluded that “sexual 
abuse, consistent with its common meaning, connotes the use 








§ 302(c).  It concludes, quite rightly, that the generic federal 
offense of “sexual abuse of a minor” requires knowledge as to 
the sexual conduct.  Under our precedent, this facial difference 
in the elements of the state and generic federal offenses 
 
of sexual or libidinal gratification.”  E.g., United States v. Ma-
teen, 806 F.3d 857, 861 (6th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases).   
I therefore would approach this case by asking two ques-
tions: (i) whether “sexual abuse of a minor,” 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1101(a)(43)(A), in the context of a statute criminalizing de 
minimis penetration with a foreign object, requires an intent to 
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the libidinal de-
sire of any person; and, if so, (ii) whether Pennsylvania’s 
carveout for “good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement 
procedures,” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3101, is sufficiently broad or in-
stead leaves less culpable conduct subject to prosecution, cf., 
e.g., Alaska Code § 11.81.900(b)(61)(B) (excluding from the 
definition of “sexual contact” acts “that may reasonably be 
construed to be normal caretaker responsibilities for a child” or 
that are “performed for the purpose of administering a recog-
nized and lawful form of treatment that is reasonably adapted 
to promoting the physical or mental health of the person being 
treated”); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1401(A)(3)(b) (excluding from 
the definition of “sexual contact” any “direct or indirect touch-
ing or manipulating during caretaking responsibilities, or inter-
actions with a minor or vulnerable adult that an objective, rea-
sonable person would recognize as normal and reasonable un-
der the circumstances”).  Still, I join the Majority in analyzing 
the Pennsylvania statute through the lens of the more general 
mens rea requirement and leave for another day the question of 








“leave[s] nothing to the ‘legal imagination,’” Zhi Fei Liao v. 
Att’y Gen., 910 F.3d 714, 724 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Gonza-
les v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)), and, because 
the state offense sweeps in less culpable conduct than the ge-
neric federal offense, our categorical approach analysis is at an 
end.  Again, I agree in all respects.  See supra 1 & n.1. 
We part company on the basis for concluding that  
§ 1101(a)(43)(A) contains a knowledge requirement, a conclu-
sion my esteemed colleagues view as consistent with ongoing 
fealty to Restrepo.  Although this approach mirrors the Second 
Circuit’s in Acevedo, I find it unconvincing.  In my view, that 
conclusion is more consistent with the open-ended statutory 
construction that Esquivel-Quintana demands than it is with 
the reflexive deference that Restrepo calls for. 
The key analytical move in Acevedo is that § 3509(a)(8) 
“does not . . . provide guidance as to the mens rea a defendant 
must possess.”  943 F.3d at 623–24; accord Maj. Op. 16 (“Sec-
tion 3509(a)(8) does not specify a mens rea requirement, and 
we cannot defer to a nullity . . . .”); id. at 19 (asserting that  
§ 3509(a)(8) addresses “the contours of the substance of the 
offense” but not “the necessary mental state”); id. at 18 n.7 
(again asserting that “§ 3509(a)(8) fails to provide the neces-
sary guidance”).  There are two things to note about that ana-
lytical move.  First, it recognizes what many of our sister cir-
cuits have acknowledged: that Rodriguez-Rodriguez did not 
adopt § 3509(a)(8) “as a definitive standard or definition” in 
interpreting “sexual abuse of a minor” in all cases.  Amos,  
790 F.3d at 519–20 (quoting Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. at 996); see Rangel-Perez, 816 F.3d at 601 (holding that  








INA’s generic ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ [offense]”).  Rather,  
§ 3509(a)(8) is merely “a guide,” Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. 
& N. Dec. at 996, and not a comprehensive one.  At very least, 
therefore, Restrepo’s statement that “we will define sexual 
abuse of a minor by reference to § 3509(a),” 617 F.3d at 796, 
is not as absolute as it may seem, and there may be times when 
§ 3509(a)(8) offers limited guidance or no guidance at all.  See 
id. at 796 n.10 (recognizing that § 3509 is only “a guide” (cita-
tion omitted)).   
Second, Acevedo’s analytical move begs the question 
whether the lack of language on mens rea in § 3509(a)(8) re-
flects open-ended silence on the required mental state—rather 
than, say, an indication that the definition has no required men-
tal state.  Answering that question is ultimately a matter of stat-
utory interpretation,7 but Acevedo assumes it away.  In my 
view, the reason it does so is plain:  “Given the inherent seri-
ousness of an aggravated felony and the harsh immigration 
consequences that come from that categorization”—not to 
mention other indications of statutory meaning, including the 
“closely related” provision in 18 U.S.C. § 2243—it is simply 
untenable that any mens rea less than knowledge could form 
part of the generic federal definition.  Acevedo, 943 F.3d at 
 
7 It might, for instance, depend on the extent to which 
“‘mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of 
criminal intent’ [can] be read ‘as dispensing with it,’” United 
States v. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (citation omit-
ted)—an issue further complicated by whether § 3509(a) 
counts as a “criminal enactment” and whether recklessness can 









624.  And because § 3509(a)(8) does not require knowledge, it 
is cast aside as not “provid[ing] guidance.”  Id. at 623.  That 
approach may allow for avoiding an impression of revisiting a 
prior panel decision in light of intervening precedent, but it 
does so at the cost of logical coherence. 
To be clear, I take no issue with the Majority’s statutory 
analysis, which cogently explains why “sexual abuse of a mi-
nor,” read in context, unambiguously embodies a knowledge 
requirement.  But I would ground that analysis in an acknowl-
edgment that at least here, deferring to Rodriguez-Rodriguez is 
inappropriate and, to the extent Restrepo suggests otherwise, it 
is no longer good law. 
IV. 
For now, Restrepo limps on.  Yet there may come a day 
when the conflict between § 3509(a)(8) and other sources of 
statutory meaning is less easily avoided.  Should that day 
come, I would recognize that § 3509(a)(8) is but one of many 
sources we must consider in analyzing, using all the tools of 
statutory construction at our disposal, whether a particular as-
pect of § 1101(a)(43)(A) is ambiguous.   
